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A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF TRUTH IN
LENDING
Jonathan M. Landers*
and Ralph J. Rohner**
INTRODUCTION
Lawmakers frequently have an imperfect view of the objec-
tives and probable impact of legislative innovations when they
spring into being. This shortcoming is truly reflected in efforts to
provide meaningful disclosure to consumers in credit transactions.
Ten years after the enactment of the federal Truth in Lending
Act,' we find numerous symptoms of disquietude with the law:
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Alan Schwartz of the University of Southern California, who read an earlier draft and
made a number of insightful suggestions.
1. The Truth in Lending Act is subchapter I of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (1976). The Act is administered by the Federal Reserve
Board, which has issued an interpretive regulation, popularly called "Regulation Z."
12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.1503 (1978).
2. The multi-sided debate emerges clearly through several sets of Senate Bank-
ing Committee Hearings. See Oversight on Consumer Protection Activities of Federal
Banking Agencies. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Simpliy and Reform the Truth in Lending Act.
Hearings on S. 1312, S 1501 and S. 1653, Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Simplication Hearings]. Of particular note is Senator
Proxmire's recognition of the difficulties. Id. at 4-5, 115-19, 353-55; see S. REP. No.
720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978). For a strong judicial expression, see Sanders v.
Auto Assocs., 450 F. Supp. 900 (D.S.C. 1978); Wilson v. Allied Loans, Inc., 448 F.
Supp. 1020 (D.S.C. 1978).
© 1979 by Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner.
All Rights Reserved.
UCLA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:711
sponsors disclaiming responsibility for the present law, consumers
and creditors alike claiming that disclosure statements are unnec-
essarily complex, and a steady stream of litigation flowing. The
ground rules for disclosure become so complex that creditors con-
vinced a number of pro-consumer legislators to adopt a novel pro-
cedure permitting the Federal Reserve Board to issue so-called
"blessed letters," a mechanism which protects creditors from legal
challenges that had their source in the vagaries of the disclosure
requirements. 3 A related disclosure statute, the Real Estate Settle-
ment Procedures Act, proved so unworkable that an embarrassed
Congress had to reform real estate transaction disclosure rules
that had been effective less than a year.4 There is a widespread
conviction that something has gone wrong but little understanding
of what it is, and what can be done.
This conviction has led to a movement for Truth in Lending"simplification." ' "Simplification" is one of those terms that di-
verse groups support in theory; differences come about quickly
when the concept is defined. Truth in Lending simplification may
mean a less restrictive statute, easier to read and less information-
packed forms; reduced liability; additional defenses; greater pre-
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f) (1976); see Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(3) (1978). The
so-called "blessed letters" are ex parte letters which immunize creditors from civilliability if they follow a staff-approved disclosure practice. Unfortunately, the letters
have substantially eroded the consumer protections in the Act itself. See, e.g., FRB
Off. Staff nt. No. FC-0130, [1974-1977 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
T 31,570 (1977) (permitting post-sale disclosures in many credit transactions); FRB
Off. Staff Int. No. FC-0060, [1974-1977 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)31,570 (1977) (exempting late charge similar to finance charge on open end plan);
ef Willis v. Town Fin. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 10 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (letter stating that
creditors are not required to disclose that security interest in after-acquired consumer
goods is limited to property acquired within ten days of transaction provides less pro-
tection than that given by the courts). The "blessed letter" practice has come under
criticism on the grounds that letters are an ex parte declaratory judgment and also
amount to administrative rulemaking without compliance with the AdministrativeProcedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976). As this Article was being com-pleted, the Board amended Regulation Z to permit public comment on "blessed let-
ters." 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(d)(2) (1978).
4. Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (1974), as amended by Real Estate Settle-
ment Procedures Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-205, 89 Stat. 1157 (1976). See
Rohner, Consumer Credit Legislation in the Ninety-Fourth Congress-and a Look
Ahead, 9 U.C.C. L.J. 307, 345-49 (1977).
5. Several Truth in Lending simplification bills were introduced in Congress
early in 1977. Senator William Proxmire (D. Wis.), Chairman of the Senate Banking
Committee, took the lead in pushing a composite bill through that Committee; it
passed the Senate on May 10, 1978. S. 2802, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC.S7232 (daily ed. May 10, 1978); see S. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
No action was taken on S. 2802 in the House of Representatives before the 95th Con-
gress adjourned. A virtually identical bill, S. 108, has been introduced in the 96th
Congress, and, at this writing, has been reported favorably from the Senate Banking
Committee. Since a more complete legislative record exists as to S. 2802, references
to proposed simplification legislation will be limited to that bill.
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emption of state law; or a host of other concepts. Fundamentally,
these varied perceptions are grounded in differences regarding the
described functions and achievable purposes of Truth in Lending
("TIL"), and they invite an analysis which can draw on a decade
of experience with the present law.
The purpose of this Article is to take a hard look at the possi-
ble objectives of a disclosure statute such as TIL, and ask the basic
question whether these objectives are attainable, and if so, what
type of a statute can best effectuate the legislative policies. Given
the lawmakers' fascination with disclosure-type legislation in the
scheme for protecting consumers, and the myths that accompany
such legislation, this undertaking should prove useful.
I. AFFECTING TRANSACTIONAL BEHAVIOR
The basic premises of TIL were that consumers needed cer-
tain information to make essential decisions in consumer credit
transactions and that the information then available as part of the
contracting process, or provided as a result of state law require-
ments, was inadequate. Proponents of Truth in Lending intended
and expected the disclosed information to influence a consumer's
behavior in the particular transaction in which the disclosures
were furnished. The Act itself faithfully articulates this purpose:
"It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful disclo-
sure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid
the uninformed use of credit ....'6
To accomplish this purpose, the Act and the Board's imple-
menting Regulation Z adopt a number of conventional means of
conveying information. First, the Act standardizes certain con-
cepts such as the Finance Charge and the Annual Percentage Rate
(APR).7 Then, Regulation Z designates an "official name" for
many of the concepts and requires that creditors use only the offi-
cial name.8 Once a consumer understands a particular term, fu-
6. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976); see, e.g., Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford,
Inc., 527 F.2d 257, 262-63 (3d Cir. 1975).
7. The APR reflects the relationship between the finance charge and the amount
financed expressed as an annualized rate of interest. See Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5
(1978). The need for standardization was caused by widespread consumer confusion
and misinformation and the disparities in methods of stating interest rates in con-
sumer credit transactions, e.g., add on, discount, monthly, and fees. See H.R. REP.
No. 1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9, 13 (1967); S. REP. No. 720, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1978); Note, Truth in Lending- The Impossible Dream, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 89,
92-94 (1970).
8. E.g., Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(2), (3), (c), (d) (1978). The courts have
understood and faithfully enforced this notion of standardization. For example, in a
credit sale, if there are no "other charges," the "unpaid balance" and "unpaid balance
of cash price" will be the same; if there is no required deposit balance or prepaid
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ture comparisons are quite simple. Often, the consumer need not
even understand the term fully-the consumer may only need to
know that higher is worse, or the term itself may have a pejorative
connotation. 9 There are also more generalized presentation re-
quirements-"clearly, conspicuously, and in meaningful se-
quence"'°-for displaying the data. Finally, the Act requires
certain important information in the contract to be included on
the Truth in Lending Statement. Cumulatively, these disclosures
seek to enhance consumer understanding, simplify the consumer's
task in processing information, and dramatically reduce search
costs. In increasing the consumer's ability to process information
and search for the best buy, the Act should also discourage credi-
tors from shifting risks to the consumer; the consumer is particu-
larly vulnerable to such risk shifting when the cost of
understanding the risk is greater than the cost of the risk being
shifted. Overall, the information should affect the decision to use
credit and to use a particular source of credit."
This legislation assumes that consumers will behave differ-
ently in their credit transaction if they are given the best possible
TIL disclosure statements. If the desired result has not been
achieved, the argument goes, it is because an adequate set of dis-.
closures has not yet been designed. But there is every indication
finance charge, the "unpaid balance" and "amount financed" will be the same.
Courts have required disclosure of both terms and have explained that the Act was
designed to facilitate shopping by standardizing concepts and terms; the consumer
could not be expected to know that the amount financed in one transaction was the
same as the unpaid balance in another if not specifically stated. See Ives v. W.T.
Grant Co., 522 F.2d 749, 756-59 (2d Cir. 1975); Chapman v. Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Nat'l Bank, 444 F. Supp. 439 (D.R.l. 1978); Grey v. European Health Spas,
Inc., 428 F. Supp. 841 (D. Conn. 1977); Lewis v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 416
F. Supp. 514, 517 (D.D.C. 1976). See also Powers v. Sims & Levin Realtors, 396 F.
Supp. 12, 20 (E.D. Va. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 542 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1976)
(creditor violated regulations because it failed to state required number of payments,
even though simple addition by consumer would provide missing figure).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1606 (1976). This technique has been widely adopted in
other contexts. For example, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act forces manufactur-
ers to label less desirable warranties as "limited warranties," 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(2)
(1976); other legislation requires furs and wool products to be labeled accurately, 15
U.S.C. §§ 68-69 (1976); and the FDA has required labeling products as "orange
drink" rather than "orange juice," see Collier & Merrill, "Like Mother Used to
Make'" An Analysis of FDA Food Standards of Identity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 561
(1974); cf E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULTZ, THE NADER REPORT ON THE FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1969) (discussing deceptive advertising practices).
10. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a) (1978).
11. There is a basic question as to whether there should be any intervention at all
in competitive markets. This in turn raises the questions of whether the consumer
credit market is "competitive," and whether one can speak of "competitive markets"
on non-numerical contractual provisions. See Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Mar-
kets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. -(1979).
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that attaining this expressed purpose is a forlorn hope. Behavioral
scientists, public opinion research, consumer research, and our
own common sense tell us the same thing: consumer behavior in a
particular transaction is almost certainly not going to be affected
by a TIL disclosure statement, notwithstanding the quality of that
statement.12
A. Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Transactional
Disclosures
1. The Timing Problem
There is a fundamental fallacy in the present approach to
TIL disclosures. From the beginning, the disclosure requirements
were premised on the notion that the TIL statement should in-
clude the particulars of the transaction that the consumer is con-
sidering. But the disclosures cannot be made until the consumer
and the creditor have negotiated a basic agreement whose particu-
lars can be ascertained. Thus, there must always be a fixing of
prices and terms before the consumer receives the disclosure state-
ment.
The Act resolves this dilemma by permitting creditors to
make the disclosures as part of the contracting process, or in other
words, after some sort of preliminary agreement has been reached
that permits the preparation of the disclosure forms.
13 Thus, the
disclosures come at, or very shortly before, the consummation of a
transaction to which the consumer is already verbally and psycho-
logically committed. 14 At this point, comparative shopping by the
consumer is unlikely.' 5 Moreover, it is equally unlikely that at
12. We have avoided any analysis of the studies on the effect of TIL upon con-
sumer behavior. They show uniformly that TIL has virtually no transactional impact.
The studies are cited in Landers & Chandler, The Truth in Lending Act and Variable-
Rate Mortgages and Balloon Notes, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 35, 65
n.64. See also Brandt & Day, Information Disclosure and Consumer Behavior An
Empirical Evaluation of Truth in Lending, 7 U. MICH J.L. REF. 297, 308-15 (1974).
13. In a typical automobile credit sale, for example, the buyer and seller would
have to reach a mutual agreement on at least the following details before a disclosure
statement could be prepared: the basic cash price; incidental charges, as for title and
taxes; the amount of any cash downpayment; the value of any trade-in; desired credit
life, disability, and property damage insurance; the rate or dollar amount of finance
charge; and the repayment schedule. This list does not include the many required
disclosure items which are probably not negotiable, such as finance charge compo-
nents, taxes, security interests, delinquency charges, and prepayment consequences.
14. In addition to overcoming the consumer's psychological commitment to the
deal informally made, subsequent disclosures must cope with the strong possibility
that the consumer will reject information that casts doubt on the wisdom of the "in-
formal" decision already reached. Psychologists call this phenomenon "cognitive dis-
sonance." See Whitford, The Function of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer
Transactions, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 400, 426.
15. Some courts have made it easier for creditors to avoid any possible transac-
tional use of disclosures by permitting preliminary application forms which contain
19791
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this point the consumer will opt to pay with cash. Thus, the pres-
ent Act does not put usable credit information into the consumer's
hands at a time when it will affect transactional behavior. 16
2. Relationship of the Consumer's Creditworthiness and the
Credit Decision
Many consumers who make credit purchases or take loans do
so in circumstances where they must obtain credit. For example,
the National Commission on Consumer Finance found that sev-
enty-two percent of credit sales involved consumers who could not
pay cash, 17 and insofar as consumer loans are used to purchase
property or services, the consumer's need is likely to be equally
acute. The customer who shops for credit must therefore shop for
two things: cost and eligibility. Such a consumer does not seek
those terms that are best in the abstract, but rather, the best terms
offered by a creditor who will approve his credit. It does the con-
sumer no good to discover a creditor offering a nine percent rate if
he does not qualify for that rate.18
In the chronology of most credit transactions, there is a pre-
liminary fixing of terms (sometimes with some measure of disclo-
sure), a determination of the consumer's creditworthiness, and
then, full disclosure. The consumer's shopping energies may dissi-
pate upon a favorable determination of creditworthiness;' 9 more-
over, the creditor's continuing ability to revoke a favorable credit
substantial credit information but do not comply with TIL. See Stanley v. R.S. Evans
Motors, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Fla. 1975); USLIFE Credit Corp., 5 CONS.
CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,279 (ALJ 1977), rev'd, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
97,938 (FTC 1978).
The staff also seems determined to permit disclosures when they are least likely
to be effective. One opinion permits creditors to delay giving the disclosures until
after the consumer agrees to the purchase and actually takes the product home and
keeps it awhile, so long as the purchase can be cancelled. FRB Off. Staff Int. No. FC-
0130, [1974-1977 Transfer Binder] CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,731 (1977). If the
value of pre-transaction disclosure is questionable because it is too late to affect trans-
actional behavior, any benefit from disclosure after the consumer has taken the prod-
uct home and used it is truly ephemeral.
16. Possible solutions to this problem are discussed at notes 79-83 & accompany-
ing text infra.
17. NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE
UNITED STATES 182 (1972) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L COMM'N]; Jordan & Warren,
Disclosure of Finance Charges.- A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1321 (1966).
While some of these purchases could be deferred, many others could not. Also, in
many cases the economic return to consumers from certain purchases is sufficiently
great to make the purchase rational even if the APR is very high. NAT'L COMM'N,
supra, at 183; accord, Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor- Oriented
Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 445, 469 (1968).
18.- See Whitford, supra note 14, at 418 & n.75.
19. Studies of behavior indicate that when two parties each have a "yes or no"
decision to make, an expressed affirmative decision by one participant tends to result
in an affirmative decision by the other. See generally Asch, Studies of Independence
[Vol. 26:711
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determination will likely act as a constraint upon overly aggres-
sive bargaining by the purchaser. Finally, the consumer's own
sense of proportion may attach more importance to whether he
can get the amount of credit he wants, whether he can get it quick-
ly, and whether the lender is otherwise accommodating.
20
3. Shopping Costs
In most transactions, shopping for credit after receipt of the
TIL disclosures is simply irrational on a cost-benefit basis. To be
sure, shopping or "search behavior" may take place at many
stages of the transaction.
21 There may be "diffused" shopping
which does not focus on a specific creditor but seeks general infor-
mation about prevailing rates and terms. This kind of informa-
tion may be obtained by talking to friends and reading consumer
publications or advertisements. In many cases, the information
will be based on the consumer's own previous credit experiences.
The consumer also may attempt to obtain information from
specific creditors, either in person or on the phone. Such attempts
almost always focus on the acquisition of information relating to
APR and monthly payments, partly because other TIL informa-
tion is too complex for oral presentation and requires calculations
that the creditor has not made. Further, one suspects that the con-
sumer is most interested in APR and monthly payments. The
Truth in Lending Act has influenced such forms of search with its
requirement that creditors quote rates in APR terms. It is clear,
however, that TIL was not intended principally to affect consumer
behavior before the formal disclosures are furnished;
22 a far dif-
ferent and simpler statute would have done that job.
The Act contemplates that shopping will occur after receipt
and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCH.
MONOGRAPHS. No. 9, # 416 (1956).
20. See Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1, 6 n.16 (1969); Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745,750
(1967). A study of pre-TIL credit buyers found that, even when consumers were
aware of differences in rates, they attached greater importance to other aspects 
of the
credit arrangement. Among those other aspects were familiarity with the creditor,
prior satisfactory dealings with the creditor, convenience, and concern about their
eligibility for the lower rates. White & Munger, Consumer Sensitivity to Interest Rates.-
An Empirical Study of New Car Buyers andAuto Loans, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1222-
28 (1971); see D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 19, 53-54 (1963) (low-income
consumers shop at stores which will extend credit); Whitford, supra note 14, at 422.
21. See Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311, 312-
18 (1970) (discussing the economic parameters of search activity); Stigler, The Eco-
nomics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
22. It may even be that creditors are now more reluctant to make advance oral
disclosures. This was the finding of a student study titled "Shopping for Credit 
in
New Orleans: An Exercise in Futility," reprinted in Simpl~ication Hearings, supra
note 2, at 333-41.
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of the disclosure statement, and it is at this point that shopping is
not cost effective. To decide whether to engage in such search ac-
tivity, the consumer must determine whether the marginal cost of
further search exceeds the marginal return. In somewhat simpli-
fied fashion, the consumer who receives a disclosure statement
and is considering whether to shop for an additional source must
consider the cost of shopping (C), the benefit (B) to be obtained
by shopping, and the probability (P) that the benefit will be ob-
tained. The value of shopping (V) can be evaluated by the follow-
ing equation:23
V= P(B) - C
Only if V is a positive figure is shopping rational.
In more concrete terms, assume the consumer purchases a
color TV at a price of $450 less a $50 downpayment. The first
dealer quotes a finance charge of $40 (roughly eighteen percent)
for payments over a one year period. We may assume that the
lowest APR under present market conditions would be about nine
percent, which would produce a finance charge of $20. To obtain
this maximum saving, the consumer must consider the costs of
shopping: both expenses for gas and wear and tear on a car or the
cost of public transportation, and the value of lost time ("opportu-
nity costs"). If the consumer decides to shop at two of the twenty
other dealers in the area, and the consumer estimates the cost of
shopping at $5 per dealer, the equation would be as follows:
V =-.10(40-20) - $10
V= -$8
Here, shopping would be irrational for the consumer.
To be sure, the matter is a bit more complicated. The costs of
shopping and the likelihood of finding the least expensive source
vary directly: where there is more shopping, the costs of shopping
rise as does the likelihood of finding the least expensive source.
One must build into the probability figure the likelihood that the
consumer will find the least expensive source on the first try rather
than the last. In the above equation, the cost of shopping is not
$10 since there is a five percent (one in twenty) chance that the
consumer will find the best price on the first try; thus, the shop-
ping cost would be $5 + .95 ($5) or a total of $9.75. But on the
other hand, the notion that the consumer will stop searching when
he finds the best price assumes that he will know that a given price
is "lowest." If this assumption is not made, the theoretical cost of
23. This formula fails to distinguish between fixed sample and sequential search
strategies. See Hirshleifer, Where Are We in the Theory of lnformation?, AM. ECON.
REV., May 1973, at 31, 36; Rothchild, Models of Market Organization with Imperfect
Information: A Survey, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1283, 1287-89 (1973). For our purposes,
however, such a simplified formula should make the point adequately. See generally
M. DEGROOT, OPTIMAL STATISTICAL DECISIONS (1970).
[Vol. 26:711
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shopping increases because the consumer must shop further to
"confirm" $20 as the lowest price. Finally, it may be possible for
the consumer to search by less expensive means such as advertise-
ments or phone. Even this technique, however, is limited because
the consumer must eventually receive the TIL statement to use the
full panoply of disclosures effectively, and this almost always will
require the costly process of visiting the creditor's premises.
The above model involves a limited search and makes some
unduly favorable assumptions. For one, it assumes a relatively
efficient market in which the cost of credit can be identified read-
ily. Indeed, one of the expressed functions of TIL is to make the
market efficient by forcing disclosure of the APR in standardized
fashion. Unfortunately, this goal may be elusive. If the consumer
is considering purchases of similar but not identical products from
different dealers, he must first determine the "value" of each prod-
uct. Small differences in value may seriously distort the stated
APR. In addition, some merchants make the task more difficult
by systematically burying finance charges in the cash price; in
such cases, the disclosed APR is virtually worthless as a standard
for measuring the cost of credit.24 Moreover, we have assumed a
search for only one term-APR. One of the purposes of TIL is to
permit comparison of a large number of terms. As the consumer
attempts to compare multiple terms, it becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to engage in pre-contract shopping to identify the probable
best buy and to obtain adequate oral information in person or on
the phone. In sum, the costs of search for the best buy based on
all the information disclosed is likely to be substantially higher
than the figures in the model because of the complexity of the
information and the need for careful and individualized attention
to the terms offered by different creditors.
25
The basic hypothesis of the above discussion is that cost-ben-
efit considerations preclude search on the basis of the TIL disclo-
sure statement in virtually all smaller transactions (i.e., under
24. The existence of widespread burying of finance charges has been widely ac-
knowledged. See Jordan & Warren, supra note 17, at 1301; Kripke, supra note 20, at
6-7; Landers, Determining the Finance Charge Under the Truth in Lending Act, 1977
AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 45, 135-45; Wallace, The Uses of Usury. Low Rate
Ceilings Reexamined, 56 B.U.L. REV. 451,482-87 (1976) (citing authorities). Unfortu-
nately, there has been little scholarly thought given to assessing the scope and extent
of burying and its impact on TIL.
25. This difficulty is somewhat analogous to the problem the consumer faces in
searching for information about a product's characteristics and quality. See Hirsh-
leifer, supra note 23, at 37-38; Holton, Consumer Behavior, Market Imperfections, and
Public Policy, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 102
(Markham & Papanek eds. 1973); Nelson, note 21 supra. This Article will later show
that TIL does not improve the consumer's ability to search for the best "terms." See
notes 54-72 & accompanying text infra.
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$2,000) and in most mid-range transactions (i e., $2,000-$10,000)
as well. In the smaller transactions, creditors' overhead costs and
the price of money tend to minimize differences in rates and other
terms.26 At the same time, when small amounts of money are in-
volved, the dollar differences of quite substantial variations in
APRs tend to yield insignificant total dollar differences, as in the
example presented earlier.
Even in the mid-range transactions, rates and terms may be
similar within a given type of creditor (e.g., banks or retailers),
thus making search not cost-effective.2 7 There is ample evidence
that consumers have adequate knowledge of the relative costs of
different types of creditors (i.e., that banks charge less than
finance companies), 28 and if they do not, this information usually
can be obtained relatively inexpensively from friends, by phone,
or through advertisements. Although TIL disclosure statements,
with their intricate detail, are likely to be effective in identifying
the most favorable transaction among creditors of the same type
who offer prices and other terms that are within narrow ranges, it
is in this case that the marginal cost of search will usually exceed
the marginal return from further search. Indeed, some
econometric studies suggest that the consumer usually will be bet-
26. In 1971, the average direct cost per personal loan at New York banks making
20,000 loans was $48.43. D. ROGERS, CONSUMER BANKING IN NEW YORK 117
(1974). While costs will vary for different types of creditors, such direct costs are
likely to be a substantial component of the finance charge for many types of credit
transactions. See generally NAT'L COMM'N, supra note 17, at 139-47.
27. For example, a consumer might well discover marked differences in the auto-
mobile credit rates offered by credit unions, commercial banks, and consumer finance
companies. But if that consumer belonged to no credit union, and had to rule out
bank loans because of downpayment requirements, he would probably find no appre-
ciable differences among rates offered by competing finance companies. In many
markets, average rates of creditors within a given category are fairly similar. For
example, a survey of five leading banks in Boston revealed APRs ranging from 9.76%
to 11.08%. The differences among leading banks in such cities as Dallas, Seattle, San
Francisco, Miami, and Washington, D.C. were less. Consumers' Union, How to Save
on a Car Loan, 43 CONSUMER REP. 202 (1978). Assuming that $5,000 is financed for
48 months, the dollar difference is about $140. Note, too, that both the amount
financed and length of time substantially exceed most typical consumer credit trans-
actions other than home mortgages.
It may be argued that these are "averages" and the consumer can bargain to get
better rates. But this cuts both ways, for the process of individualized shopping and
"haggling" involves substantial transaction costs including in-person shopping, fol-
low-up negotiations, and the inability to compare by way of advertisements or gener-
alized surveys.
28. See F. JUSTER & R. SHAY, CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO FINANCE RATES: AN
EMPIRICAL AND ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION 59-61 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Oc-
casional Paper No. 88, 1964); Brandt & Day, supra note 12, at 322-26; Day & Brandt,
A Study of Consumer Decisions.- Implications for Present and Prospective Legislation,
in I NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE TECHNICAL STUDIES 29-30, 95,
112-16 (1972); Kripke, supra note 20, at 4; Kripke, supra note 17, at 460-64, 462 n.42,
466 & n.51.
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ter off by accepting the first offer in cases where search costs are
high, as they are when the search takes the form of comparing
disclosure statements, and distribution of prices is narrow.
29
In sum, the consumer who is inclined to search will probably
adopt the least costly expedient: searching by advertisements or
telephone communications. Such pre-contract and pre-disclosure
search permits broad coverage of creditors, frees the consumer
from any psychological "confrontation" with a given creditor, and
may prove to be most cost effective because, after this early search,
only in the rare case will the marginal return from search after
receipt of the TIL statement exceed the costs of search.
30 Al-
though TIL could be designed to reduce the marginal cost of fur-
ther search (e.g., by requiring creditors to send a fully completed
TIL statement upon request to the consumer's house,
31 an idea not
being proposed), the present Act is ill-suited to serve such an ob-
jective.32
B. Infirmities in Truth in Lending
The consumer who attempts to make some use of TIL in
transactional behavior faces a difficult chore. In many instances,
the statement is virtually unreadable and filled with numerous
categories of information. To some extent, this situation rein-
forces the cost-benefit problem of increasing search costs well
above their theoretical minimum. Moreover, the consumer faces a
special problem in evaluating the terms of the transaction: be-
cause the basic principles of TIL have not been applied to "term"
disclosure, it is difficult to understand and evaluate the data. Fi-
nally, the consumer faces an equally serious problem because in-
29. See, e.g., Tesler, Searchingfor the Lowest Price, AM. EcON. REV., May 1973,
at 40.
30. In non-credit transactions, consumers shop more intensively for higher-
priced products than lower-priced products. See Bucklin, Testing Propensities to
Shop, J. MKTG., Jan. 1966, at 22; Newman & Staelin, Prepurchase Information Seek-
ingfor New Cars and Major HouseholdAppliances, 9 J. MKTG. RESEARCH 249, 251-52
(1972); Udell, Prepurchase Behavior of Buyers of Small Electrical Appliances, J.
MKTG., October 1966, at 50.
3 1. For example, creditors could be required to send a fully completed disclosure
form to consumers upon request. The costs of implementation would probably be far
out of proportion to the benefits, and such an idea has not been suggested seriously.
We only make the point that search costs can be reduced if that is the paramount
objective.
32. Some economists make an even more basic criticism. They have suggested
that ordinary market mechanisms would probably provide information that was de-
sired by a significant number of consumers. By definition, then, if disclosure must be
compelled by the state, it is of relatively little importance and/or will influence a
small number of purchases. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 4.7,
13.3 (2d ed. 1977); Whitford, supra note 14, at 428. Any evaluation of this point is
beyond the scope of our discussion.
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The consumer's behavior in the transaction will not be af-
fected if the credit disclosures are so numerous and, in conjunc-
tion with other contract provisions, so formidable as to create a
"cognitive overload." That is, the consumer becomes over-
whelmed by the aggregate mass of words and figures and reacts by
ignoring the disclosures entirely.
A typical retail installment sale contract may be printed on
both sides of a legal-sized sheet of paper containing the pertinent
credit information, descriptions of the item purchased, warranty
and servicing information, credit and property insurance provi-
sions, and much more. The credit disclosures may be interspersed
among the other items on the face of the form, and some disclo-
sures may refer to other disclosures in other portions of the form.
The completed document is given to the consumer at a time and
under circumstances that are not conducive to careful reading and
study. Many consumers are simply unable to sort out, process,
and evaluate all of the information presented. The unconscious
response may be to ignore everything--except, perhaps, a quick
confirmation that this is in fact the "right" contract.
There is, admittedly, no "hard" evidence that this is occur-
ring in the case of Truth in Lending Statements. But, in a recent
and provocative study, Professor Jeffrey Davis has shown that
consumer understanding may be increased by dropping some dis-
closures and simplifying others, thus suggesting that some type of
information excesses may inhere in the present requirements. 34
This phenomenon of cognitive overload also has been postulated
in other disclosure contexts, and there is no reason to doubt that
something of the sort occurs with respect to credit disclosures as
well. Available studies suggest that typical consumers can man-
age six, seven, or maybe eight "bits" of information, but that more
33. A related problem is that, in some cases, the disclosed information is simply
inaccurate as a basis for consumer behavior. For example, the inclusion of "optional"
insurance in the amount financed tends to distort the APR vis-h-vis a comparable
transaction without insurance. Also, the consumer's inability to obtain a high rate of
return on money "saved" by paying a lower APR means he may be much better off
taking a higher APR for a shorter period of time. Inclusion of some front-end costs in
the amount financed (filing fees and some real estate closing costs) tends to distort
both the APR and finance charge. The problem of partial burying of the finance
charge is unresolved. See Landers, supra note 24, at 81, 132-34, 135-45 & n.219.
34. Davis, Protecting Consumersfrom Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook: An Em-




than eight likely will produce overload results.
35 Obviously, the
present Act requires disclosure of substantially more than this
quantum level. Indeed, the nature of the information involved in
a credit context, and the relative stressfulness of the situation, sug-
gest that cognitive overload is more likely to occur in the case of
credit disclosures than in those cases where it has been identified
already. Clearly, a consumer will not use disclosed information
for shopping purposes if he has not focused on it.36
Of course, some consumers can process more complex infor-
mation.37 There is no "correct" way to make this sort of policy
judgment. However, if the purpose of the Act is to influence a
substantial portion of the credit-consuming public, attention must
be paid to the phenomenon of cognitive overload for the mass of
consumers.
There are several theoretical ways to reduce information
overload, but each presents its own difficulties and may frustrate
other desired functions of the disclosure scheme. The most obvi-
ous response is to reduce the number of items disclosed to within
the manageable range of six or eight that is suggested by the em-
pirical data. To do this, however, means deciding that some of the
information now disclosed is expendable. Which items should go?
Should we omit itemizations, for instance, of the finance charge or
of the amount financed?38 Should we drop disclosures of terms
relating to default or security? Indeed, which of the current dis-
closures are the most important? Professor Davis supports dele-
tion of the insurance disclosure while consumer advocates regard
these disclosures as of key importance.
39 It is impossible to as-
35. See Miller, The Magic Number Seven Plus or Minus Two. Some Limits on our
Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PSYCH. REV. 81 (1956). See generally
Bettman, Consumer Information Acquisition and Search Strategies, in THE EFFECT OF
INFORMATION ON MARKET BEHAVIOR (A. Mitchell ed. 1978); see also Jacoby, Speller
& Kohn, Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load- Replication and
Extension, I J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 33 (1974).
36. The very notion of "information overload" has hardly won wholesale accept-
ance. Compare Russo, More Information Is Better. A Reevaluation of Jacoby, Speller
and Kohn, J. CONSUMER RESEARCH, Dec. 1974, at 68, and Summers, Less Informa-
tion Is Better?, II J. MKTG. RESEARCH 467 (1974), with Jacoby, Information Load and
Decision Quality. Some Contested Issues, 14 J. MKTG. RESEARCH 569 (1977), and
Jacoby, Szybillo & Busato-Schach, Information Acquisition Behavior in Brand Choice
Situations, 3 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 209 (1977), and Scammon, "Information Load"
and Consumers, 4 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 148 (1977).
37. Some studies suggest that "smarter" consumers cannot process more items of
information; they can, however, process more complex bits of information. Davis,
supra note 34, at 848-49.
38. This is the approach of the Senate bill. S. 2802, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14(a)
(1978).
39. Davis, supra note 34, at 862 & n.71. Indeed, the FRB's own simplification
proposal not only retained the present insurance provisions, but added a right of re-
scission which required further disclosures. S. 1846, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1977).
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sume a consensus on this question, especially if we wish to retain
some of the other functions for credit disclosure described below.
Another possible response to information overload would be
to separate from the underlying contract those credit disclosures
the consumer should heed for shopping purposes. This might be
accomplished by requiring the key disclosures on a separate sheet
of paper-a kind of credit "price tag." Or perhaps the critical dis-
closures might remain on the contract document, but in a clearly
conspicuous, segregated position-perhaps boxed at the top of the
front page.40 Requiring disclosure on a separate sheet, though,
would add another piece of paper in all transactions, with attend-
ing costs and clutter, and would create new problems in policing.
A boxed separate disclosure statement on the original contract, on
the other hand, would still compete for attention with other con-
tract provisions and would require duplicative statements of the
important credit terms-once in the disclosure box and again as
part of the contract.
In short, any attack on information overload involves sub-
stantial trade-offs. Further, much of the complexity of present
consumer credit agreements flows from provisions required or
permitted by state law, on which federal disclosure requirements
are superimposed. Without substantial preemption of state laws,
reducing the number of disclosures to produce a disclosure format
that would capture consumer attention is probably an impossibil-
ity.4 1 Even then debate would continue over which disclosures are
to be retained as essential "bits."
In addition, it is suggested here that all the discussions of in-
formation overload and the imperfections of present methods of
delivering information are somewhat beside the point. That is,
proponents assume, as stated at the outset, that TIL will affect
transactional behavior if the statement is improved. 42 And, as
"proof' that TIL is effective, they cite increases in consumer
awareness. 43 The fallacy is to equate knowledge and understand-
40. The Senate bill temporizes as to the exact format, requiring only that the
disclosures "shall be conspicuously segregated from all other terms, data, or informa-
tion provided in connection with a transaction, including any computations or
itemization." S. 2802, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14(b) (1978).
41. Cf. Mason v. General Fin. Corp., 542 F.2d 1226 (4th Cir. 1976) (mixing of
federal and state required disclosures violates intent of the Truth in Lending Act to
create a uniform system of credit terminology across states and lending institutions).
Even preemption may not do the job, since an increasing portion of the clutter results
from various federal laws. For example, Professor Davis recommends deleting the
FTC "holder" notice. Davis, supra note 34, at 361-62. We are not particularly san-
guine about the prospects of realizing agreement of federal regulators in eliminating a
disclosure such as the FTC holder notice which was considered a "major" step in
assuring consumer protection.
42. See note 6 & accompanying text supra.
43. Opponents of "simplification" repeatedly rely on increased awareness of
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ing with transactional behavior. Undoubtedly there is a relation-
ship: transactional behavior cannot be affected if consumers do
not understand their credit transactions. But the converse is not
necessarily true; simply because consumers have greater under-
standing does not mean that their immediate transactional behav-
ior will be affected. Implicit in our earlier discussion is an
acceptance of the conclusion that transactional behavior is not
likely to be affected by TIL disclosures." And it has already been
noted that there is no hard evidence that suggests 
otherwise.45
2. Dysfunction in the Delivery of Information
Common sense suggests that an individual's ability to com-
prehend information is related to the conditions under which the
information is imparted and must be learned. Most TIL disclo-
sures are given under circumstances that are extremely stressful
and not suited to careful deliberation and analysis. Usually, at
least in closed end transactions, the information is given by a per-
son sitting or standing in close proximity to the consumer. The
physical conditions are likely to be at least mildly intimidating-a
"sterile" bank, a small room, other persons milling around. The
consumer may be distracted by children, noise, interruptions, or
unrelated conversation; and there may be subtle references to the
need for speed.46 The person with whom the consumer "negoti-
ates" the credit arrangement may be an authority figure (the
"credit man") who is separated from the sales activities and is
somewhat forbidding.47 The consumer may lack a desk and paper
and pencil to make any calculations. This is not to say that con-
sumers will not do their best, but it does suggest that whatever
APRs as a reason for not changing TIL. See, e.g., The Attack on Truth 
in Lending, 42
CONSUMER REP. 6-08-10 (1977). The most this suggests is that present requirements
for disclosing the APR not be changed. This is a straw man: so far 
as the authors are
aware, there has been no serious suggestion for such a change.
44. See notes 13-32 & accompanying text supra.
45. See note 12 & accompanying text supra.
46. Numerous studies show that the relative stressfulness of a situation affects 
the
consumer's ability to process information. See, e.g., Wright, The Harassed 
Decision
Maker: Time Pressures, Distractions and the Use of Evidence, 59 J. APPLIED 
PSYCH.
555 (1974) (subjects buying cars under time pressures or distractions 
consider fewer
attributes and weighted negative information more heavily).
One study of car buyers showed that 40% of new car buyers received the 
disclo-
sures within 10 minutes of signing the contract and another 27% within one 
hour of
signing. Comment, The Impact of Truth in Lending on Automobile Financing-An 
Em-
pirical Study, 4 U.C.D.L. REV. 179, 200 (1971). See generally Day & 
Brandt, Con-
sumer Research and the Evaluation of Information Disclosure Requirements.- 
The Case
of Truth in Lending, J. CONSUMER RESEARCH, June 1974, at 21.
47. Consumers may respond readily to the subtle command of authority, 
espe-
cially if they have the illusion of free choice. See Milgram, Some Conditions 
of Obedi-
ence and Disobedience to Authority, 18 HUMAN REL. 57, 57-67 (1965). 
See also P.




optimum value can be obtained from TIL transactional disclo-
sures is not likely to be attained, indeed, even approached, under
such conditions.4
8
Many consumer credit transactions arise in connection with
the purchase of a product. The consumer may suffer from what
might be-called a "decisional overload." That is, the credit terms
are likely to have much less significance in the consumer's eye
than the color, model, brand name, accessories, and cash price of
the item purchased. The consumer is likely to give much more
thought to, and be much more excited about, the overall purchase
than its credit aspect which, after all, will be only a fraction of the
total investment. Fully aware of the credit cost implications, the
consumer may give them no more significance than the cost of the
air conditioning in the car he is purchasing; "credit" is something
he must tolerate to get behind the wheel. Indeed, from the con-
sumer's point of view, the decision to get air conditioning has
greater economic significance than the credit terms since the cost
of air conditioning almost always exceeds any saving which might
be obtained by shopping for credit.49
Consumer surveys demonstrate that consumers making a
purchase on credit consider product-related decisions to be more
important than credit-related decisions50 Moreover, it may be
that the typical consumer is simply unable to evaluate multiple
components of the transaction and weigh them as part of an over-
all package.5' Instead, the consumer may just shop for price and
significant options and defer to the credit-seller on other matters.
The insurance provisions of TIL furnish a good example of
this effect. Under TIL, credit life and credit accident and health
insurance are not included in the finance charge unless the
purchase is voluntary and the consumer specifically requests the
48. One study of persons who financed the purchase of automobiles showed that
approximately 75% spent less than 30 minutes in gathering and evaluating informa-
tion relating to the financing arrangements. Friedman, Using Simulation Techniques
to Predict the Behavioral Effects of New Laws. The Case of Truth-in-Lending Legisla-
tion and the Consumer, 54 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 297, 298 (1970).
49. The cost of air conditioning on a 1978 Buick Century (a medium priced car)
is about $550. If the consumer finances $5,000 for 48 months at 10%, the finance
charge is $1087; at 13%, it is $1439. The potential saving is thus $352. As noted
earlier, the amount "saved" is not likely to be as high as 3%. See note 27 supra.
50. NAT'L COMM'N, supra note 17, at 181-82; Brandt & Day, supra note 12, at
317-19; cf Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 131, 145-47 (1970) (describing a
fictional car purchase).
51. There is considerable data which suggests that consumers consider a small
number of features in making purchase decisions, even if information on more fea-
tures is readily available. See Hansen, Consumer Choice Behavior. An Experimental
Approach, 6 J. MKTG. RESEARCH 436 (1969); Jacoby, Szybillo, & Busato-Schach, note
36 supra; Katona & Mueller, A Study of Purchase Decisions, in I CONSUMER BEHAV-
IOR 30 (L. Clark ed. 1954).
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insurance after disclosure of the price and voluntary nature of the
purchase.5 2 Here, then, the Act goes beyond passive receipt of in-
formation, to require affirmative action by the consumer. More-
over, the unspoken premise of the TIL approach, indeed the
essence of the consumer advocates' position on this issue, is that
credit insurance is overpriced and ought not to be purchased in
most transactions. In fact, the TIL insurance scheme has proven
almost totally ineffective in insurance purchase decisions, and reg-
ulatory bodies continue their concern over insurance penetration
rates of between ninety and one hundred percent.
53 The failure of
TIL to affect this problem should give some pause for thought as
we speak about influencing consumer decisions on terms of the
contract that have less economic significance than insurance.
3. The "Term Disclosure" Dilemma
Term disclosure generally refers to those contractual and
non-numerical items that are required to be disclosed by the Act.
In particular, the Act requires disclosures of prepayment penalties
and rebates; default, delinquency and late payment charges; se-
curity interests; and, in open-end accounts, the method of deter-
mining the balance to which finance charges will 
be imposed. 54
The first question to be addressed is why disclosure of term
items is required at all. If we assume, contrary to what has been
said above, that some disclosures may affect transactional behav-
ior, the question remains whether these disclosures will affect
transactional behavior. The answer appears to be negative: con-
sumers will likely not understand the issues and cost dimensions
of term disclosure, and even if they did, the economic conse-
quences would be de minimis so that change in transactional be-
havior would not be rational on a cost-benefit basis.
It has already been noted that the basic purpose of Truth in
Lending is to standardize the concepts involved in consumer
credit decisions and to use standardized terminology as an aid to
decision making.55 This approach theoretically lowers the cost to
the consumer of acquiring information and should prevent credi-
tors from shifting costs to consumers by virtue of consumer apathy
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (1976); Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a)(5) (1978).
53. The Federal Reserve Board cited this data in suggesting that consumers be
given a right to cancel such insurance for a time after the credit transactions. BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 62D 
ANNUAL REPORT 1975, at
277-78 (1976). The Federal Trade Commission, on the other hand, used 
the same
experience to support its contention that credit insurance premiums should 
be in-
cluded in the finance charge in all cases. See Simplification Hearings, supra 
note 2, at
136 (statement of Lewis H. Goldfarb, Acting Assistant Director for Special Statutes,
Federal Trade Commission).
54. See Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.7(a)(2), (b)(I)(viii), .8(b)(4)-(7) (1978).
55. See notes 6-9 & accompanying text supra.
19791
UCLA LAW REVIEW
or inability to evaluate the trade-offs involved. Thus, consumers
can compare the "finance charge" of one transaction with another,
with certainty that they are comparing the same thing. It must be
assumed, however, that consumers will know that finance charge
is synonymous with cost of credit-otherwise, the comparison it-
self will not aid in the decision-making process. The strength of
this approach is that the key comparison is reduced to a numerical
amount-the consumer simply must know that highest is worst.
The very premises of cost disclosure are inapplicable to TIL
requirements for term disclosures. There is, for example, no
standardization of terminology: a security interest may be called a"consensual security interest under the Uniform Commercial
Code," a "mechanic's lien," a "mortgage" or some other term.
Whether there are substantive differences in these terms from the
consumer's point of view is not clear. And if there are differences,
whether they are relevant to the consumer's decision is also un-
clear. A second example of the inapplicability of the premises of
cost disclosure to term disclosure is the unfeasibility of numerical
comparisons. For example, consider two methods that may be
utilized to compute and disclose rebates on prepayments: rebate
by the rule of 78s 56 or rebate by the actuarial method less an ac-
quisition charge of $15. The consumer cannot possibly make a
rational decision on the preferability of one of these methods; in-
deed, even the expert probably cannot, because the answer will
depend on the amount of the loan and the timing of the prepay.-
ment.57 Therefore, the basic premises of cost disclosure as circum-
scribed in TIL law-standardization of terminology and
numerical comparisons for simplified credit shopping-have not
been employed in the area of term disclosure.
56. See generally Landers, Truth in Lending: Closed End Credit, PRAC. LAW.,
June 1978, at 36; note 57 & accompanying text infra.
57. The Board has essentially conceded that this disclosure is meaningless; the
Board's justification is that the explanation would be incomprehensible anyway and
would further complicate the disclosure statement. See Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 493
F.2d 135, 140 (9th Cir. 1974) (TIL does not require an explanation of the rebate
method); Wallace, supra note 24, at 467; c/ Hunt, The Rule of78: Hidden Penaltyfor
Prepayment in Consumer Credit Transactions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 331, 349-50 (1975)
(Federal Reserve Board position is that prepayment rebate disclosure requirement is
satisfied merely by reference to the name of the method used to compute the rebate).
One of the somewhat ironic twists on this whole rebate issue came in the hearings
on Regulation Z when Congresswoman Sullivan told Governor Robertson of the
Board that she did not understand what the rule of 78s was, Governor Robertson
stated that he hoped this would be explained in TIL disclosure statements even
though the Board's model forms-which were part of the hearings record-contained
no such explanation. Hearings on Consumer Credit Regulations Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs ofthe House Banking and Currency Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
404 (1969). It is unlikely that counsel for plaintiff in Bone knew of this exchange,
which was buried in the thousands of pages of hearings on TIL.
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Even assuming that the consumer could understand the
"term" issues in a manner that would permit effective decision
making, it is doubtful that shopping would be rational in the sense
of producing benefits. Most of the term disclosures relate to two
circumstances--early payment or default. Aside from small loans,
default is an infrequent occurrence, and thus the economic conse-
quences are not relevant to the vast majority of consumers. Thus,
even assuming wide differences in default charges, the consumer
must weight these extensive differences in light of the small
probability of default. While it may be argued that consumers
know that they might default and therefore might consider the
charge, it is more likely that a consumer will not consider the pos-
sible charges for default at all because he does not expect to de-
fault.58 In any event, a rational consumer will have to consider
additional costs of a given default package multiplied by the like-
lihood of default, with the total discounted by a consumer's rate of
return reflecting the fact that any default will be in the future, and
balance these against the costs of shopping and other cost items.
For example, if the difference in the "value" of the default pack-
age offered by two creditors is $200-probably a high figure-and
the chance of using it is seven percent, also high
59 (and eliminat-
ing any figure for the discount entirely), the economic import is
only $14-not an amount for which it is rational to do extensive
shopping. Also, it must be remembered that the search costs are
high because of the lack of standardization and the difficulty of
evaluating the cost factors. Finally, the TIL Act provides no help-
ful guide to evaluating the relative benefits and detriments of dif-
ferent cost and non-cost items, for example, how much higher a
finance charge the consumer should pay for "favorable" default
provisions. The figures may be staggering: a recent study suggests
that the difference in default packages on a $1300 loan must be
$850 to make it rational for the consumer to pay an addition of
58. Abundant evidence suggests that many defaults occur because of events
which are essentially unpredictable such as loss of job, reduced wages (e.g., no over-
time), health problems, marital difficulties, or other calamaties. See D. CAPLOVITZ,
CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 77, 167-74 (1974);
Greer, Creditors, Remedies and Contract Provisions.- An Economic and Legal Analysis
of Consumer Credit Collection, in I NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE
TECHNICAL STUDIES 7-9 (1972); cf. D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROB-
LEM, PROCESS, REFORM 47 (1971) (consumer who does not foresee his predicament is
unlikely to plan for it when engaging in a credit transaction).
59. See R. JOHNSON, COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CREDITORS REMEDIES 16-17
(1978) (prepared for FTC in connection with proposed Trade Regulation Rule). Ac-
tually, this seven percent figure is unduly high since it includes many persons whose
default was simply one or two late payments, which would give rise only to a late
charge. The number of consumers whose default was sufficiently serious to raise the
question of valuing default remedies is probably closer to two or three percent.
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one percent to the APR.60 Present-day TIL statements give the
consumer no help in making this kind of evaluation.
Borrowers from small loan companies are said to have a
much higher than average default rate, but it is precisely for these
borrowers that the default disclosures are not likely to influence
transactional behavior. First, many of these borrowers are ra-
tioned in that they cannot qualify for all the credit they want.
These consumers will take credit at any price, and afortiori, on
any terms.61 Moreover, small loans tend to involve lesser amounts
than other credit transactions, with the result that the dollar con-
sequences of different default provisions will not be as great.
Again, shopping becomes irrational on a cost-benefit basis. Fi-
nally, these consumers tend to be the least well-educated, thus
suggesting even higher search costs to evaluate different default
provisions and determine which is best.62
Many of the same factors apply in the case of prepayment
provisions. Most consumers do not expect to prepay, dollar differ-
ences are not great, information is not presented meaningfully,
and search costs are high.
The net result is that disclosure of default and prepayment
terms is unlikely to influence the consumer's decision in the par-
ticular transaction. It is, of course, possible to argue that consum-
ers "ought" to get disclosure because the terms are "important."
This Article will examine other justifications for disclosure that
will take account of these arguments. But there is no serious basis
to assume that consumers will consider the term disclosures in
making immediate credit decisions.63
4. The Omissions from Term Disclosure
Even assuming that the consumer does take the time to read
and evaluate the "term" disclosures and has sufficient knowledge
and understanding to determine the various "trade-offs" involved,
TIL does not provide him with the information necessary for a
rational decision. Put another way, TIL leaves out information
which is of greater importance than information which is put in,
with the result that a decision based on TIL information may be
irrational. Some of this information is contained in the underly-
ing contract and can be included if the consumer takes the addi-
tional time to review it; still other information requires an
60. R. JOHNSON, supra note 59, at 23.
61. See NAT'L COMM'N, supra note 17, at 179; Johnson, The Uniform Consumer
Credit Code and the Credit Problems of Low-Income Consumers, 37 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1117, 1119 (1969); Kripke, supra note 20, at 6; Kripke, supra note 17, at 461 n.40.
62. This increase may be balanced by the fact that the value of the time lost by
searching (the opportunity cost) is likely to be less for such consumers.
63. See note 78 infra.
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understanding of the Uniform Commercial Code, other consumer
credit legislation, or judicially developed common law.
What must be disclosed and what need not be disclosed with
respect to default best illustrates this problem. The present Act
requires disclosure of a late charge, additional charges that may
be imposed unilaterally by the creditor upon default, and in some
jurisdictions, the right of a creditor to accelerate the maturity of
the obligation.64 Also, the creditor must disclose any security in-
terest it has. But default has far more serious consequences from
the consumer's perspective. The most important are: it sets into
motion a process of acceleration, which is sometimes disclosed;
65
repossession, which is never disclosed; the imposition of addi-
tional charges for the repossession and collection, which is rarely
stated in dollar terms; sale of the collateral, which is never dis-
closed; and the consumer's possible liability for a deficiency,
which also is never disclosed.66 In addition, there is no disclosure
that if the consumer elects to refinance the obligation-an option
often offered-there may be substantial front-end charges.
In connection with default, the most important information
may not be "legal" in nature at all. That is, although a missed
payment may trigger default, acceleration, and repossession,
many creditors often defer invoking these remedies while the con-
sumer attempts to cure.67 One study has found that there were
64. The question whether an acceleration clause must be disclosed as a default
charge may represent the nadir of Truth in Lending analysis. There is at least a three-
way split among the federal circuit courts on the issue, with some district courts tak-
ing still a fourth view. See St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 573 F.2d 572 (9th Cir.
1977) (disclose whether rebate upon acceleration and method of making rebate);
Begay v. Ziems Motor Co., 550 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1977) (no disclosure regardless of
rebate); Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975) (no
disclosure if rebate; unearned interest not rebated); Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs,
Inc., 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (disclosure always required). The Federal Re-
serve Board staff has taken yet a fifth view. FRB Off. Staff Int. No. FC-0054, 5 CONS.
CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,522 (1977) (apparently, disclose if rebate upon acceleration
is different from rebate upon prepayment). See McDaniel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, 571
F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (following FRB approach as a "practical one in a
debatable area . . . where uniformity is desirable").
65. See Begay v. Ziems Motor Co., 550 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1977). Judge Hollo-
way dissented from the court's holding that an acceleration clause was not a default
charge because: "If the lighter burden of no more than $5.00 for a late payment is a
required disclosure where acceleration of the whole debt is not demanded, why
should not the heavier burden of all unearned finance charges being collectable as a
part of the accelerated debt be disclosed?" Id. at 1250; accord, Chapman v. Rhode
Island Hosp. Trust Bank, 444 F. Supp. 439 (D.R.I. 1978).
66. Cf. F.R.B. Off. Staff. Int. No. FC-0 117, [1974-1977 Transfer Binder] CONS.
CRED. GUIDE [CCH] 31,703 (1977) (consumers do not have to be told that they are
not subject to a deficiency judgment if the creditor repossesses the collateral at a time
when the loan balance is under $1250).
67. Creditors often provide a phone number, or "hot-line," for consumers to call
if they are unable to meet payments. For example, the widely publicized "simple
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more than thirty formal or informal contacts before creditors in-
voked repossession; but there probably are substantial differences
among creditors. 68 Thus, an informed consumer would want to
obtain some idea of the creditor's actual collection policy: is it
easygoing, firm but fair, or tough?
Of perhaps equally great significance are the panoply of col-
lection weapons that do not involve the collateral but would likely
impact the consumer's decision. Such matters as the degree of of-
fensiveness of the creditor's collection efforts, his ability to put
pressure on the debtor through significant persons such as em-
ployers or neighbors or to obtain and enforce a judgment by exe-
cution or garnishment, and the creditor's willingness to report
defaults to a credit bureau, are prime examples. Indeed, the possi-
bility of injury to the physical or emotional well-being of the con-
sumer, and the possibility that the collection effort may produce
outrage and frustration, are probably of greater concern to the
consumer than the pure "pecuniary" considerations. 69 It is impos-
sible to value such costs. 70 In addition, many states have exemp-
tion laws that prevent creditors from seizing specified property to
satisfy debts, and the newly enacted Bankruptcy Reform Act con-
tains a lengthy list of property that will be exempt in the event of a
bankruptcy proceeding. 71 However, the consumer who engages in
a credit transaction often is not told that the creation of a security
interest in otherwise exempt property will defeat the exemption in
a state collection proceeding, nor can we expect him to be told of
the special rules in bankruptcy concerning security interests in ex-
empt property.72 In the Fifth Circuit, creditors must now disclose
English" form of Citibank states: "Hotline: If something should happen and you
cannot pay on time, please call us immediately at [number]."
68. See Johnson, Denial of Sef-Help Repossession.- An Economic Analysis, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 82, 94 (1973). Professor Johnson's data has been questioned, but even if
substantially overstated, it makes the basic point that collection efforts are not limited
to pure "legal" issues. See also Dauer & Gilhool, The Economics of Constitutionalized
Repossession.- A Critiquefor Professor Johnson and a Partial Reply, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.
116, 139 n.70 (1973).
69. Recent consumer literature emphasizes the significance of these psychic costs.
See Wallace, supra note 24, at 459 & nn.34 & 35, 473, 492 & n.172 (citing authorities);
cf. Wallace, The Logic of Consumer Credit Reform, 82 YALE L.J. 461, 471-72 (1973)
(default leads to low self-image resulting in substantial shame and embarrassment).
70. See Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection,
80 YALE L.J. I (1970) (enumeration of harms inflictable upon the debtor by the credi-
tor in a theoretical game context).
71. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. I, 92 Stat. 2549, i1
U.S.C.A. § 522 (West Pamph. 1979).
72. Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1331 (West
Pamph. 1979), non-purchase money security interests in certain exempt consumer
goods or tools of the debtor's trade will not be enforceable against the debtor in bank-
ruptcy. Id. § 522(f). On the other hand, a purchase money security interest in such
items will be effective in bankruptcy. Although these "fine points" of exemption law
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a waiver of exemptions as a security interest;
73 there is no explana-
tion of what an "exemption" is or what it means to lose this bene-
fit.
The point to be made is not that the term disclosures now
required have no significance. Rather, it is that other, more
significant factors are undisclosed and that these have the effect of
making any decision based on the disclosed factors of questiona-
ble rationality.
5. The Federal Trade Commission Trade Practices Rule
Perhaps the most striking evidence of the failure of TIL to
affect transactional behavior on the terms of credit contracts has
come from the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). In its re-
cently proposed Trade Regulation Rule on Credit Practices, the
FTC seeks to (1) outlaw cognovit notes, waivers of exemption,
and wage assignments; (2) limit the taking of security interests
and require an identification of each item of encumbered prop-
erty; (3) require repossessing creditors to credit the fair market
value of seized property; (4) prohibit attorney's fees; (5) limit late
payment and deferral charges; and (6) regulate co-signer prac-
tices. These rules concern some matters that are subject to TIL
disclosure requirements and some which are unregulated.
74
It is interesting to examine the FTC's justification for the
rule.75 The Commission argues that consumers have no bargain-
ing power over the terms of the transaction but must accept credit
contracts on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. There are resplendent
references to inadequate information as to the probability of de-
fault or the operation of default remedies, and, perhaps even more
importantly, the creditor's ability to badger and threaten the de-
faulting consumer in a way that will make the consumer's life
downright miserable. The FTC suggests that consumers lack ade-
quate information and that they cannot possibly understand the
economic and social costs of the risks being assumed when they
agree to the matters to be regulated. Finally, it is argued that
these matters are not significant to creditors but have an enormous
impact on consumers. One must stand in awe of this reasoning as
may have enormous consequences in the event of default and bankruptcy, the con-
sumer will remain ignorant of them.
73. See Lamar v. American Fin. Sys., 577 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1978); Elzea v. Na-
tional Bank of Georgia, 570 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1978).
74. FTC, Proposed Trade Regulation Rule Regarding Credit Practices, 40 Fed.
Reg. 16,347 (1975).
75. See FTC Memorandum in Support of Trade Regulation Rule to Limit Cred-
itor Remedies (Apr. 19, 1974) [hereinafter cited as FTC Memorandum]. See also
Wallace, Toward a New Approach to Default-Model of Constructive Consumer Credit
Reform (FTC Bureau of Cons. Protection).
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applied to TIL. As to those matters covered by present TIL re-
quirements, TIL has been singularly ineffective in having any dis-
cernible impact on the bargaining process, the learning process, or
the evaluatory process. As to those matters not covered by TIL,
TIL has been woefully inadequate; disclosures have been omitted
in areas of major consumer significance. Indeed, although not ad-
dressed to this point, parts of the FTC Report imply that this is a
significant limitation of TIL. 76
This is not the appropriate place to evaluate the FTC's pro-
posal. However, it does not seem remiss to question whether an
assault on the underlying credit practices should not be accompa-
nied by a more realistic assessment of what disclosure can and
cannot be expected to accomplish. 77 Furthermore, taking the
FTC's report on its face leads us to suggest that the FTC has, at
least tacitly, reached many of the same conclusions about term
disclosure that have been set forth here.78
C. Can Truth in Lending Affect Transactional Behavior?
If TIL is to affect transactional behavior, transactional infor-
mation must be provided to consumers in time to permit its utili-
zation as part of the decision-making process. Deficiencies in the
present Act could theoretically be remedied by two approaches.
Under one approach, some sort of waiting period would be re-
quired between the time the credit information is put into the con-.
sumer's hands and the time he is permitted to make a binding
contract. Alternatively, the emphasis of TIL would be changed
from disclosure of information regarding the particulars of the
consumer's transaction to some type of generalized disclosure for
the creditor's transactions. There are serious objections to both
approaches.
The waiting period approach could be implemented by
76. See also FTC, Proposed Trade Regulation Rule Regarding Credit Practices,
40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975).
77. Proponents of substantive regulation of credit terms are frequently realistic in
their assessment of the value of disclosure. See, e.g., Wallace, supra note 24, at 475-
76, 494; cf. Jordan & Warren, supra note 17, at 1320-22 (value of disclosure to most
consumers is limited; could be enhanced by provision of effective consumer protec-
tion in area of creditors' remedies).
78. One well-known consumer organization has failed to address adequately the
issues in the debate over term disclosures. On several occasions, Consumers' Union
urged retention of the term disclosures because of their importance for decisionmak-
ing. See Recommendations of Federal Credit Legislation Subcomm. of the Corpora-
tions, Banking and Business Law Comm. of the Young Lawyers Division of the ABA
(Mar. 22, 1978) (dissenting opinion). But its editors told consumers shopping for new
cars that "you can locate the lemons before you sign on the dotted line. Just keep
your eye on the APR." 43 CONSUMER REP. 201 (1978). The entire discussion of new
car loans is addressed to cost alone. There is nary a mention that consumers should
also consider the terms of the credit contract.
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(1) requiring a set time period between disclosure and the making
of a binding contract, or (2) delaying the binding effect of a con-
tract signed at the time the disclosures are given by some sort of
rescission or "cooling off" period.
79 The former method presents
three obvious difficulties. First, since the consumer would, by
definition, have to use the creditor's facilities and personnel twice,
there would be increased costs. The longer the period, the greater
the attending costs, because the process of making a binding con-
tract is likely to require a more complete review of what was
transacted at the time the disclosures were furnished. Second,
there are difficult policing requirements, especially if the period is
to be rather short, for example, one hour. Third, and perhaps
most important, this method would dramatically alter credit prac-
tices since the consumer's initial commitment to the transaction
would be weaker. Thus, creditors might be expected to spend
much more effort the first time to "sell" the consumer and to solid-
ify the particular deal.8
0 While some consumers would say that
this approach is desirable, there is no question that it will cost
more, perhaps substantially more.
The rescission method suffers from precisely the opposite
problem, that is, it is not likely to be effective. Studies of "nega-
tive option" plans suggest that consumers rarely utilize the plans,
and the FTC repeatedly has condemned such arrangements on
precisely this ground.8' Moreover, the consumer is already psy-
chologically and verbally committed to the particular transaction;
and, again, costs will increase, perhaps considerably. In the case
of a loan, creditors will have to choose between not disbursing the
money and thereby requiring a second "visit," or disbursing it and
facing the potential risk of non-collection upon rescission. In sales
of goods, sellers may be reluctant to allow the consumer to take
the item home and thereby save delivery and handling costs. In
79. Vermont formerly permitted a one day cooling off period on retail sales 
of
goods and services, both cash and credit, if the consumer had not received a substan-
tial portion of the goods or services. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 2454 (1971). The statute
was later limited to door to door sales, with a three day cooling off period. Id. § 2454
(Supp. 1978).
The pending Senate bill would approximate the first of these approaches in home
mortgage transactions, by requiring that good faith estimated disclosures be given
within three days after loan application. S. 2802, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 14(b) 
(1978).
In most mortgage transactions, there will be a built-in delay of several weeks 
or
months before settlement, so the consumer has a period of time to consider the disclo-
sures and theoretically to shop elsewhere.
80. Cf Sher, The Cooling Off Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 UCLA L. REV.
717, 730-32, 733-35 (1968) (salesman's function is to bring consumer to point of deci-
sion; if decision involves greater commitment, more sales effort is likely to be re-
quired).




both cases, there are also the costs of turning one transaction into
two.
The alternative of providing more generalized disclosure has
its own disabilities because of a basic premise of TIL that consum-
ers will compare the costs and terms of their transaction. To the
extent information is generalized, the consumer will lack mean-
ingful information about his particular transaction. For example,
since bank consumer loan rates are likely to vary within a rela-
tively narrow range, simply telling the consumer that the average
rate is twelve percent, or that the range is ten to fourteen percent
does not give him enough information for advance comparisons.
Indeed, there is ample evidence that consumers have fairly good
institutional knowledge of which lenders charge less, that is, that
banks generally charge less than finance companies, and consum-
ers probably do not need TIL for this purpose;82 instead, they
need it to compare the relatively smaller differences that are likely
to exist within a single class of creditors. In addition, practical
limitations on presentation dictate relatively little informa-
tion--certainly much less than on the typical TIL statement.
In fact, each of the possible techniques for generalized disclo-
sure has distinct weaknesses. Posting of credit terms within the
creditor's premises requires that the consumer visit those premises,
that he be aware of the postings, and that he have the time and
convenience to examine them without pressure to get on with his
business. The collection and dissemination of rates and other
terms through brochures or flyers prepared by the creditor, or by a
public or private institution on a geographical basis, may involve
substantial implementation costs; the data is probably out of date
by the time of publication; and there remains the difficulty of get-
ting the information into the consumer's hands in a timely man-
ner.83 Advertising of credit terms through print or electronic
media is haphazard in its impact: creditors cannot be compelled
to advertise, there is no assurance that consumers will see or react
to the ads, and traditional concerns about deceptive advertising
are more likely to inhibit than to enhance a creditor's willingness
to publicize terms. In sum, generalized information cannot be ex-
pected to affect transactional behavior in the same way individual-
ized disclosure might.
Our conclusion is that generalized disclosure is not a substi-
tute for TIL-type disclosures in affecting consumer decisions. If
82. See note 28 supra.
83. The Senate bill would direct the Federal Reserve Board to experiment with
the preparation and dissemination of APR brochures. S. 2802, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 18(a) (1978). At an earlier time, some of the Small Loan Acts required rate posting.
See B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 38 (1965).
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properly organized, individual disclosure might prove effective,
but substantial changes are necessary in both the method of deliv-
ering the pertinent information and the timing of delivery. It may
be that the costs of effective delivery far outweigh the benefits to
be derived.
II. ALTERNATIVE FUNCTIONS OF TRUTH IN LENDING
A. Limited Transactional Impact-The Alert Function
If it is too much to expect TIL disclosure statements to affect
transactional behavior on a large scale, perhaps they may have a
more limited impact. That is, TIL disclosures are not expected to
facilitate shopping as such, but they do lead to a general aware-
ness of rates and other terms. If the TIL statement reveals rates
and terms that are within anticipated norms, the consumer is satis-
fied; but a TIL statement containing rates or terms that are outside
of anticipated norms acts as a red flag. It alerts the consumer, at
the very least, to examine the proposal with greater than usual
care. This effect is consistent with studies of consumer behavior
that suggest that consumers do not shop for what might be termed
the "best buy," but rather shop for goods and services that will
satisfy their wants and that are within an acceptable level of price
and quality. 84 For example, a consumer who wishes to buy a
portable color television may not shop if the quoted price is be-
tween $400 and $500 unless there are other factors which cause
dissatisfaction, such as a negative experience with the salesperson,
but will refuse to buy at $550.
In concrete terms, this "alert function" might work as follows.
A consumer making a credit purchase of a new car brings an
awareness that the APR should be in the twelve to eighteen per-
cent range.85 A consumer quoted an APR of seventeen percent
does not shop elsewhere because this is consistent with his expec-
tations, and the cost-benefit factors noted earlier inhibit shopping.
But a consumer who receives a TIL statement with an APR of
thirty percent will be alerted, at least, to question the reason for
such a rate, and perhaps, to take his business elsewhere. It should
be emphasized that this is not a shopping response as such; rather
it is a negative response to a particular credit grantor. 86 This
84. See Permut, Consumer Information Processing 7-8 (Memo to the FRB May
28, 1977).
85. Of course, it is necessary to increase consumer "awareness" of rate norms.
There are indications that TIL has been quite effective in accomplishing this limited
objective. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY 3-7
[hereinafter cited as 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY]; BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 64TH ANNUAL REPORT 1977, at 334-38 (1978).
86. There is some evidence that consumers behave in this way, although the im-
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"alert function" is quite consistent with the economic cost-benefit
analysis suggested earlier.87 That is, the "alert" cases are situa-
tions where the credit costs (APR) so clearly exceed the norm that
the marginal return from further search is likely to exceed the
cost.
If this is the function of a disclosure statement, then it is pos-
sible to make some tentative judgments about what TIL should
require. First, since the alert function is essentially an immediate
response to an unexpected stimulus, disclosures must be relatively
simple and uncluttered. The consumer will not be "alerted" to
something that is hidden in a maze of fine print. Second, the dis-
closures must be such as to permit rough and ready comparisons.
Numerical figures are perhaps best suited to this purpose, since
consumers can readily make a side-by-side comparison with an
expected norm. By the same reasoning, to the extent that there is
no "norm," this process is unlikely to occur. Third, the disclosures
should not require further analysis for comparative purposes.
Since the alert function is, in essence, a conditioned reflex to a
single stimulus, the alert is much less likely to occur if the con-
sumer must go through one or more analytical or mathematical
steps to determine whether the particular matter is within an an-
ticipated norm. 88
If the alert function is the principal objective of TIL, then the
TIL statement would be expected to emphasize the crucial "cost"
terms, since these are most likely to alert the consumer to a ques-
tionable transaction. For example, such matters as the APR, the
finance charge, the periodic payment, and perhaps "other
charges" (e.g., for insurance, filing fees, added services) would be
included. On the other hand, many of the computational disclo-
sures would be eliminated since these are not designed for head-
to-head comparative purposes and tend to detract attention from
those numerical categories of information which are supposed to
alert the consumer. Similarly, disclosure of the terms of the trans-
action would not be included in their present form because of the
consumer's inability to evaluate term items against acceptable
norms so as to trigger the "alert" response and because many of
the term disclosures require several analytical steps to make the
pact of TIL is less than clear. Thus, when some bank cards eliminated the free ride
period, consumers responded with vocal complaints. But, it was not the TIL disclo-
sures of the elimination of the free ride that triggered the response; rather, it was the
unexpected appearance of a finance charge on the monthly statement.
87. See notes 23-32 & accompanying text supra.
88. This phenomenon is somewhat similar to designating an official name for aproduct (e.g., peanut butter) and anticipating that consumers will not buy a similar
product without the official name (e.g., peanut spread).
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comparisons.89 To the extent that term disclosures were to be in-
cluded, the Act would have to be revised to serve the alert func-
tion better. Thus, if it were expected that consumers would
compare rebate methods, the Act might give standardized or offi-
cial names to different methods in the hope of encouraging this
kind of side-by-side comparison. For example, a rebate by the
actuarial method might be termed the "preferred rebate method,"
and the rule of 78s method the "nonpreferred rebate method."
90
Such an approach could enable the consumer to make direct com-
parisons and would alert him to an unfavorable rebate method.
There is, however, a danger of overemphasizing the price
terms. All terms are really "cost" terms in that they affect the
overall cost of credit. Insofar as the price-tag items such as APR
and finance charges are stressed, creditors may be encouraged to
shift costs to consumers by adjusting default provisions or other
terms. 91 Legislatures have recognized this possibility: creditors
have been prohibited from including certain terms in credit con-
tracts on the assumption that consumers are unable to evaluate the
trade-offs involved. 92 But short of forcing competition on price-
tag items by a comprehensive standardization of credit contracts,
and, to some extent, creditor practices, regulations will leave cred-
itors considerable freedom to alter term provisions to avoid the
impact of competition on price-tag items. This tactic may be par-
ticularly pernicious, since the main impact of such cost shifting is
likely to fall on defaulting borrowers because many of the terms of
the credit contract which shift risks pertain to default. While it
may be arguable social policy whether or not non-defaulting
lower risk borrowers should pay higher prices for credit to absorb
losses that are properly allocable to higher risk borrowers who
have a strong likelihood of defaulting, it seems relatively certain
that higher risk borrowers should not be burdened with costs that
properly should be borne by all borrowers.
89. See, e.g., notes 56-57 & accompanying text supra.
90. See note 57 & accompanying text supra.
91. See NAT'L COMM'N, supra note 17, at 24; see FTC Memorandum, supra note
75, at 279. Some high risk lenders use default provisions to compel frequent refinanc-
ings which generate added income in the form of front-end charges and fees not sub-
ject to rebate requirements.
92. For example, recent consumer credit legislation sets a ceiling on insurance
charges, defines "default," restricts delinquency charges, regulates rebate methods,
limits the taking of security interests, and regulates or prohibits post-default charges
for repossession, resale, and attorney's fees. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
(1974).
Another example of this phenomenon is the prohibition by many states, and now
by the Federal Trade Commission, of a waiver of defense clause giving the creditor
holder in due course status. See 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1978). See generally Comment, The
FTC's Holder-in-Due-Course Rule. An Ineffective Means ofAchieving Optimality in the
Consumer Credit Market, 25 UCLA L. REV. 821, 822-27 (1978).
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B. A Contract Synopsis
TIL may be viewed as an attempt to provide consumers with
a summary of the important information on the entire credit con-
tract for use not only at the time of transaction but also during the
performance phase of the agreement. Although that was not the
original conception of TIL, there has been increasing talk of the
need to serve this function.93 A glance at the typical consumer
credit contract, with its maze of fine print and seemingly obscure
and arcane provisions, further reveals this need.
Disclosure in the form of a contract synopsis serves a number
of interrelated functions. The TIL statement would translate and
explain the contract, and the consumer should be better able to
understand its content during contracting, performance, or de-
fault. The TIL statement also serves a related purpose: it acts as a
badge of good faith and enables the consumer to verify and check
the basic contract charges, his own responsibilities, and the rights
of the creditor. In this sense, the disclosure may produce greater
emotional satisfaction with the transaction and a feeling that the
consumer is not being deceived. 94 Though the gain is difficult to
quantify, there is something to be said for eliminating consumer
suspicion and increasing the consumer's sense of confidence and
well-being. 95 If such were the objective of the Act, disclosure in
less legalistic, everyday language of such matters as computational
elements, security interests, and the creditor's collection rights
would become important.
The contract synopsis can also serve another function, one
which consumers support strongly. The disclosures provide a
93. See Simplfication Hearings, supra note 2, at 286, 298, 307-09.
94. In the survey by the National Commission on Consumer Finance, consumers
who had recently engaged in a credit transaction and said that they noticed TIL infor-
mation were asked in what way the information was used. Fifty-four percent an-
swered that they did not have a specific purpose, but felt better knowing charges and
rates. In another question, consumers who said that they used TIL information gen-
erally in credit transactions were asked how they used the information. Forty-five
percent said that they felt better knowing charges and rates. See Brandt & Day, supra
note 12, at 309-10. In the recent Federal Reserve Board survey, more than 80% of the
respondents, excluding those who responded that they did not know, agreed with the
statement that TIL makes people more confident in dealing with creditors. These
figures were contained in the "raw data" for the survey but, for reasons that are un-
clear, were not included in the final report. 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY, supra
note 85, at i, 19.
95. It is sometimes suggested that providing such information has intrinsic worth.
Cf Dauer & Gilhool, supra note 68, at 147-49 (availability of constitutionalized re-
possession provides debtor with a measure of control over events affecting him; thus
there is intrinsic value to the procedure itself); Summers, A Critique of Professor
Fried's Anatomy of Values, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 598, 620-23 (1971) (Professor Fried
argues that laws have not only instrumental value, but have intrinsic value as "ends in
themselves").
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means by which sunlight can be shed on state-law contract provi-
sions that are archaic, oppressive, unconscionable, or outright 
ille-
gal. The clearest manifestation of this effect occurs when the 
TIL
disclosures reveal terms that are illegal under applicable state 
law:
for example, excessive interest or other charges, impermissible 
in-
surance provisions, overbroad security interests, or improper 
re-
bate methods.96 Contract synopsis disclosure not only permits 
the
consumer to seek remedies for violations but also discourages 
the
use of impermissible terms for their in 
terrorem value. 9
7
But even for those contractual provisions that are not clearly
unlawful, TIL would serve a law reform function. Even though
TIL would not affect the underlying state law, meticulous 
disclo-
sure would bring to the fore contract provisions long hidden 
in the
boilerplate. Recent litigation over disclosure of the right of 
accel-
eration,98 credit insurance,
99 and non-purchase money security in-
terests' 00 serves this purpose. In the long run the disclosures 
could
help to promote substantive law reform through uncovering 
con-
tract provisions that might not be justifiable in the present 
market-
place. In other words, consumers now agree to outlandish 
terms
like acceleration because they do not understand the impact 
or
costs of the terms. Disclosure would likely reduce the imbalance
between creditor and consumer understanding. While disclosure
does not benefit consumers in their immediate transactions, 
it may
result in the eventual elimination of many untoward practices.
This could occur through litigation, through the political process,
or through publicity embarrassing creditors into not using 
certain
terms or at least reassessing the need for them.'
0' For example,
96. Consumer spokespersons stress the utility of TIL disclosures for 
this purpose.
See Simplificafion Hearings, supra note 2, at 278 (statement of 
James Boyle). See also
id. at 299 (testimony of Willard P. Ogburn, National Consumer 
Law Center).
97. In this connection, assume a creditor's TIL statement 
discloses a right
claimed by the creditor which violates state law. Is there a 
violation of TIL or only of
the applicable state law? See Pinkett v. Credithrift of America, 
Inc., 430 F. Supp. 113
(N.D. Ga. 1977); ef. Gennuso v. Commercial Bank & Trust 
Co., 566 F.2d 437 (3d Cir.
1977) (cannot disclose confession of judgment clause if not 
taken).
98. See cases cited at note 64 supra.
99. Eg., Hickman v. Cliff Peck Chevrolet, Inc., 566 F.2d 
44 (8th Cir. 1977) (dis-
closure of credit life insurance premium as part of 
amount financed was proper).
100. Eg., Anthony v. Community Loan & Inv. Corp., 
559 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir.
1977) (reference to security interest in personal property 
and to rights and remedies
under U.C.C. sufficient to apprise borrower of security 
interest created in "closed-end,
nonsale credit transaction"); Gennuso v. Commerical 
Bank & Trust Co., 566 F.2d 437
(3d Cir. 1977) (failure adequately to describe property 
subject to security interest vio-
lative of TIL); Blackmond v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co., 428 F. Supp. 344
(D.D.C. 1977) (failure to provide clear description 
of all property subject to security
interest violative of TIL).
101. The best recent example of this phenomenon has 
been the movement to "sim-
ple English forms." In the process of drawing up such 
forms, creditors have dis-




creditors might be expected to deliberate before contracting for an
attorney's fee of twenty percent upon default or to conclude that
level term credit life insurance was unnecessary.
Consumer advocates rely on the "contract synopsis" function
rather than the original concept of affecting transactional behavior
because it promotes subjective values and produces intrinsic re-
wards. It does not purport to affect transactional behavior and,
therefore, is not capable of evaluation in functional terms. In-
deed, consumers have switched to the contract synopsis justifica-
tion partially because of some embarrassment over the failure of
the statute to produce any discernible impact on transactional be-
havior. To say that this was not the original purpose of TIL
misses the point; consumer advocates would argue that TIL is pro-
moting this highly desirable function, and its historical raison
d'etre is irrelevant so long as its present raison is meaningful and
important. And who is to say that promoting consumer under-
standing and a better sense of well-being is not a significant public
benefit?
It is difficult to determine what types of disclosures contribute
to a person's sense of satisfaction and well-being, but some tenta-
tive thoughts can be ventured. First, the statement must be clear
and easily understood. 0 2 A consumer is unlikely to be reassured
and satisfied by something he cannot comprehend. Second, the
disclosure statement must not conflict with the consumer's under-
standing developed during the negotiation stage, nor can the state-
ment be contradicted by non-TIL information elsewhere on the
same document, since such inconsistencies are not likely to reas-
sure the consumer. Finally, the synopsis must be accurate and
complete; important terms should not be omitted that may later
come to haunt the consumer. Unfortunately, the Act, as presently
construed, does not produce a contract synopsis that meets these
tentative objectives.
A quick perusal indicates that present TIL statements are fre-
quently unclear and incomprehensible. It is unlikely that consum-
ers understand such terms as deferred payment price, security
interest, rule of 78s, prepaid finance charge, and the like, which
are all features of most present day TIL statements. It is also
probable that consumers do not fully appreciate the distinction
between unpaid balance of cash price, unpaid balance, amount
102. The Senate bill attempts to do this in several ways. First, it would require
brief explanatory phrases to accompany the chief disclosure items. S. 2802, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 14(a) (1978) (amending § 128(a)(8) of the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1638(a) (1976)). Second, it directs the Federal Reserve Board to p'repare
model disclosure forms and model clauses which utilize "readily understandable lan-
guage to simplify the technical nature of the disclosures." Id. § 5(a) (amending § 105
of the present Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (1976)).
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financed, and deferred payment price.
0 3 In addition, the present
law allows creditors to integrate TIL disclosures 
with other disclo-
sures that are required by federal or state law, and 
with the con-
tractual terms themselves. Thus, although one 
would expect a
contract synopsis to be segregated from the documents 
being sum-
marized, this is a rare occurrence. In sum, it is 
not surprising to
find survey results showing that consumers 
in overwhelming
numbers find present TIL statements to be complicated.
10 4
The contract synopsis function is similarly undermined 
if "in-
consistent" disclosures are permitted 
elsewhere on the form.
10 5
For example, a consumer is hardly likely to feel 
confident and
reassured if he reads the APR as eighteen percent, 
and elsewhere
the document states that interest is computed 
at the rate of "$10
per $100 add on."' 0
6 Real estate transactions are an area of con-
tinuing confusion, since the disclosed APR, calculated 
by includ-
ing points and other front-end charges, is a mysterious 
figure to
consumers who are accustomed to thinking in 
terms of the con-
tract rate applicable to the unpaid balance. Similarly, 
a consumer
is unlikely to feel reassured if the TIL statement 
contains a one-
sentence description of "default charges" and a ten 
paragraph sec-
tion of the contract entitled "remedies 
upon default."'
' 0 7
What terms should be included in the synopsis 
and, of per-
haps even greater importance, what terms should 
be left out? By
definition, not all contractual terms can be included, 
since the
statement would no longer be a synopsis. Should 
the included
terms be those that will affect the larger number 
of consumers,
such as missing a payment and incurring a late 
charge, or those
that have the largest economic or physical consequences, 
such as
default, seizure and sale of collateral, and liability 
for a deficiency
103. Even Senator Proxmire expressed some bewilderment 
about these terms dur-
ing the Senate hearings. Simplfication Hearings, 
supra note 2, at 116-17.
104. In the recent Federal Reserve Board 
survey, more than 80% of respondents
(excluding "don't know" answers) agreed with 
the statement that TIL statements are
complicated, and almost 75% of the respondents 
(excluding "don't knows") agreed
that some TIL information is not very useful. See 
1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY,
supra note 85, at 19.
105. An application containing credit information 
not in TIL terminology or for-
mat, and with important items omitted, is likely 
to confound the consumer. See note
15 supra.
106. Yet under the present Act a creditor may 
feel obliged to describe the rate in
this way to comply with state law. Cf Mason 
v. General Fin. Corp., 542 F.2d 1226
(4th Cir. 1976) (State disclosure statutes are 
subordinate to but not preempted by
TIL). Federal regulations explicitly permit 
inconsistent disclosures under state law.
Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(b) (1978).
107. This suggests the wisdom of some form 
of comprehensive preemption provi-
sion. See S. 1501, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 
15 (1977). The need to distinguish between
state disclosure laws and state substantive laws 
regulating consumer credit transac-
tions may make the problem insoluble. For 
example, should the TIL Act Preempt a
state law which requires a promissory note to 
provide for "interest" at six percent?
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judgment? Should disclosure be required when the economic con-
sequences are small or, perhaps, when a particular matter is regu-
lated by statute?l08
The authors suggest that these are the relevant questions to
ask if Congress is serious about providing a contract synopsis. We
could also suggest that the present Act is vulnerable to a charge of
being misleading insofar as it attempts to provide such a synopsis.
It has been noted that disclosure is required of terms that have
little economic significance and terms that frequently are regu-
lated by statute; but terms such as acceleration, rights and limits
upon nonjudicial repossession, liability for deficiency judgments
(including both the balance of the debt and "extra" charges occa-
sioned by the default), a creditor's willingness to forego collection,
the consumer's ability to obtain a refinancing or deferral, and"cure" periods are omitted. A consumer who faces default and
confronts these consequences, none of which appear on the "sy-
nopsis," might have a sense of being "bushwhacked."
There are other difficulties with the use of TIL disclosures for
the "synopsis" function. One is the consumer's perception of dis-
closure. It is not clear that consumers readily understand the dis-
tinction between a law that requires creditors to disclose certain
information and a law that regulates the content of the informa-
tion, that is, the terms of the consumer credit contract itself. In
this connection, some congressional proponents of TIL have had
to answer letters from angry constituents who queried why TIL
regulation permitted the creditor to charge an APR of twenty-two
or twenty-five percent. In fact, the disclosures may have quite an
opposite effect from the intended purpose of requiring disclosure
so that a consumer can evaluate the transaction for himself. That
is, the federal disclosures may reduce the consumer's guard since
the aura of regulation may suggest that he already is protected.
Moreover, it should be recognized that the "contract synop-
sis" function conflicts with other TIL objectives. To the extent
that consumers can be taught to evaluate relative credit costs, it
becomes more difficult to accomplish such evaluations when the
statement includes additional terms. It is unlikely that consumers
can or will be turned into walking consumer protection experts,
and as more term disclosure is included, the impact of the cost
information inevitably will be minimized. This is not to urge the
108. Moreover, if it is decided to disclose default charges, what is a default charge?
Does it include a five dollar late fee, 10% attorney's fee, cost of repossession, failure to
rebate a portion of the finance charge, right of acceleration, or other consequence of
default? These are difficult questions to answer, but they are ones which must be
answered by those who would support the contract synopsis notion. See generally
Landers, Truth in Lending: Closed End Credit, PRAC. LAW., June 1978, at 32.
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abandonment of the synopsis function; it is only to illustrate 
in-
consistencies among TIL objectives.
Although the "contract synopsis" serves a law reform func-
tion, it is difficult to regard such a goal as a serious basis for the
present Act. First, it is somewhat misleading to talk about shed-
ding sunlight on provisions that have always been "hidden."
These provisions in question have long been included in state stat-
utes and in contractual documents, and at least sophisticated con-
sumer representatives have been aware of their existence.
0 9 Also,
if creditors have been utilizing such archaic and oppressive proce-
dures, the victimized consumers must have been aware as well.
Finally, the impact of disclosure on such unfair provisions is not
clear. In some cases, it will be a bit easier for consumer lawyers to
find substantive state law violations in consumer contracts; and,
there is certainly an inducement for consumer lawyers to essay
law-reform allegations in the form of TIL violations on behalf of
clients in default who have no other substantive defense. But 
ful-
filling this end would require a detailed and intricate TIL state-
ment, since general and superficial information is likely to 
be
ineffective in unearthing violation of the typically technical provi-
sions of state regulatory statutes. Whether it will reform the 
law is
problematical: disclosure has not led to reform in the past when
reform-worthy provisions have been hidden in the contract; where
significant reform of state consumer credit law has occurred-in
the states enacting the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, for exam-
ple-it is impossible to trace that reform directly to abuses
brought to light through Truth in Lending disclosures. If there is
a need for substantive law reform, one can only wonder whether
disclosure requirements will contribute to that effort.
C. Special Issues of Open-End Credit
Most of the prior discussion pertains largely to closed-end
credit, although many of the comments are equally pertinent to
open-end credit. The peculiar nature of open-end credit causes
the disclosure issues to be somewhat different, and some attention
should be given to these special elements.
TIL requires disclosures to be given in open-end credit trans-
actions at two points: at the opening of an account, and at the
time of each periodic statement, usually monthly.
0 The time re-
lationship between the opening of a credit account and the first
credit transaction varies. In some cases, the account is opened at
109. The drafters of the Model Consumer Credit Act evidently 
knew enough
about most of these provisions to provide for their prohibition. MODEL 
CONSUMER
CREDIT ACT (1973).
110. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.7(a), (b) (1978).
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the time of the first transaction, and if this is the case, the disclo-
sure issues are similar to those for closed-end transactions. Most
typical of these cases are accounts opened by retailers at the time
the consumer desires to make a purchase. On the other hand, con-
sumers may open an account, as in the case of a bank credit card,
before any specific transaction is undertaken.
With respect to the pre-use disclosures in open-end credit, the
shopping goal is even more tenuous. At the time of an individual
purchase or cash advance with an existing credit card, the con.-
sumer is powerless to shop for a better credit deal no matter how
well-informed he is about the costs incident to the use of that card.
His "shopping" option is essentially limited to paying cash or us-
ing those credit cards he has and the seller accepts. Moreover, at
the time of his initial application for open-end credit, the con-
sumer is unlikely to have many specific transactions in mind, and
his attention is more likely to focus on the usefulness of that par-
ticular open-end plan than on its credit terms. For instance, he
may want simply to gain access to a particular department store,
or he may desire the general convenience, widespread acceptance,
or prestige of a bank card. With the rates for open-end credit so
uniform, and other terms, such as the balance assessment method,
so arcane, the consumer probably would not shop for open-end
credit on any comparative basis at all. Moreover, the initial dis-
closures suffer from an important defect: they attempt to explain
a plan in the abstract, without any concrete examples. Whether
the consumer can be expected to understand a highly intricate
credit plan in the abstract is open to question.
For our purposes, the important disclosure is the billing state-
ment. Most of the consumer's credit decisions are based on the
billing statement, and the billing statement frequently provides
actual figures representing the consumer's transactions which il-
lustrate the operation of the plan. Several important distinctions
between the typical open-end disclosure and the typical closed-
end disclosure merit comparative analysis. First, in closed-end
disclosure, the TIL statement represents only part of the docu-
mentation of the transaction, and frequently, additional contrac-
tual provisions are on the face or back of the documents. In
contrast, the typical open-end disclosure statement serves as both
the required disclosures under TIL and the underlying contract.
In other words, in the area of open-end disclosure, TIL has cap-
tured the essence of the contractual arrangement. Second, the
consumer engages in repetitive transactions which generate the
same TIL form. The consumer is constantly reminded of the criti-
cal credit provisions, and he is in a position to revise or modify his
[Vol. 26:711
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use of that credit plan if its terms strike him as unacceptable."'l
The repeated disclosures, therefore, have a considerably greater
chance of affecting transactional behavior than the one-shot dis-
closures in closed-end transactions. Third, the nature of open-end
credit means that monthly finance charges are likely to be small.
For example, an open-end account of $1,000 will usually involve a
monthly charge of $15. Moreover, since the consumer can always
pay in full, he does not face the same level of economic conse-
quences as when he agrees to a closed-end transaction extending
over a considerable period of time."
2
Most important, however, is the dearth of competition on the
nominal APR: virtually all open-end creditors will charge the
statutory maximum. Whatever competition there is comes in the
form of differences in billing methods, or, more precisely, on three
billing "issues": (1) is there a "free ride" for new purchases;
(2) how is the balance determined for the purpose of computing
the finance charge; and (3) are there finance charges on amounts
paid in full during the billing period?
Present day open-end plans differ markedly in answering
each of these questions, and there are a number of permutations
and combinations of the basic calculational elements. For our
purpose, it is enough to appreciate that although all plans may use
the same nominal APR, the true APR when calculated on a his-
torical basis differs markedly depending on the particular method
employed. "1 3 On a randomly selected group of accounts, the high-
est may be well over fifty percent more than the lowest, and it is
possible to construct a set of "horribles" in which the true APR
under some of the methods will exceed one hundred percent.' 
14
To the extent that competition, if any, is realized between
billing methods, the TIL statement will affect consumer behavior
only to the extent that the consumer can understand the method
employed by a given plan and evaluate that method against other
I 11. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
112. Consumers can prepay closed-end obligations and get somewhat the same
result. But consumers do not think in terms of prepayment, and often for a good
reason: there are frequently contractual penalties and an absence of rebates of front-
end charges, which together make prepayment costly indeed. Moreover, closed-end
transactions tend to have much larger balances, thus making early payment
financially difficult.
113. See McAlister & DeSpain, The Effect of Alternative Billing Methods Upon
Retail Revolving Credit Yields (Credit Research Center, Purdue University 1976); S.
REP. No. 278, 93D CONG., IsT SESS. 29-37 (1973) (additional views of Senators
Proxmire and Hathaway); Kripke, supra note 17, at 466-67.
114. For example, the previous balance method gives no credit for payments of
less than the full balance due. Thus, if the consumer is billed $100 on the billing date
and pays $85 the next day, the finance charge is computed on the full $100. At a




alternatives. It strains credulity to think that consumers can do
this under present circumstances. A glance at a typical description
of billing methods quickly reveals intricate language, technical
terminology, and an absence of examples, except insofar as the
consumer's own subsequent transactions provide examples. In-
deed, many bank card statements contain descriptions of three or
four different billing methods, each of which is used for different
components of the card plan. The consumer is unlikely to under-
stand these provisions and is likely to be in a similar quandary
when he sees the eighteen percent nominal rate and an actual rate
which is somewhat different. " 5 Finally, the emphasis on the nom-
inal rate as the key shopping item, and the fairly common knowl-
edge of the similarities of nominal rates, is patently misleading
since it tends to detract attention from the important differences in
billing methods and suggests that, contrary to reality, all creditors
charge approximately the same amount.
It can be argued that the available information permits the
consumer to comprehend the different methods if he takes the
time and effort. Moreover, given a number of transactions and
the length of time involved, the consumer has an economic incen-
tive to acquire the necessary information. This may be true, but it
tends to contradict the basic assumption of TIL that consumers
need help in processing and understanding transactional informa-
tion. Indeed, none of the TIL aids-standardization of concepts,
official names, "meaningfulness," and numerical comparison-is
adapted to this problem. Moreover, the consumer is not alerted to
the need to get more information; he is told that the most impor-
tant numerical disclosure-the APR-is the same for everyone.
One must conclude, reluctantly, that billing method descrip-
tions cannot be simplified so that they will be understood readily.
The answer, if there is one, may be to designate one or more
methods by "official names" in the hope that competition will en-
courage creditors to use them. For example, the average daily
balance method with a free ride for new purchases and no charges
for payment in full could be designated as the "preferred billing
method"; creditors using it or any more favorable method would
only be required to state that they used the "preferred billing
method." Other creditors might be required to explain their
methods, or creditors using a particularly "expensive" billing
method could be required to state that they used the "high cost
billing method." Such an approach would be consistent with the
115. This can often occur when, for example, a consumer obtains a cash advance
for which there is a one-time two dollar fee. On the first monthly statement, the
actual APR will be higher than 18% because the two dollar charge is computed into
the finance charge on top of the periodic rate for that month. Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R.
§§ 226.5(a)(3), .7(b)(I)(v), (vi) (1978).
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original objective of TIL: to produce standardized terminology to
reduce search costs."16
D. Consumer Defenses to Creditor Actions
The present Act has served a different function from those
discussed above. In many cases, it has provided consumers with a
defense to a creditor's collection action. Sometimes, the consumer
had no defense at all aside from the possibility of filing some sort
of insolvency proceeding, and other times the consumer's "real"
defense was much more difficult to assert. A combination of a
favorable statute, easy to find violations, procedural advantages,
minimum damages, and payment of attorney's fees made the TIL
defense a viable consumer weapon.
1 7 To consumer advocates,
the fact that the TIL claim was, in a sense, feigned, was of 
no
moment. The consumer had a real grievance and was permitted
to exercise it through the legal system.
Until recently, the TIL claim could be used offensively or de-
fensively to reduce the creditor's claim or, privately, as a basis 
for
negotiation and settlement. More recently, the stakes have esca-
lated considerably. Courts in two states have held that the exist-
ence of a TIL violation ipso facto makes the entire obligation
void. 18 These decisions have not been based on the Act itself, but
on little used state rules that transactions that violate federal law
are void. Even under the present statute, creditors have strong
inducements to settle TIL actions;
19 if the creditor's risk in litiga-
tion becomes the possible invalidity of every single credit transac-
tion using a particular form, the inducements are correspondingly
greater.
There may be something to be said for a statute that acts as a
safety valve for disgruntled consumers. The trouble with this pur-
pose is that it cannot be kept within its banks-there is no assur-
ance that consumers who assert violations have any real grievance
beyond inability to pay, or that if they do, their grievance 
is
against the particular creditor whose form contains the violations.
And the resulting warfare between consumers and creditors clogs
court calendars, inflicts arguably needless costs on creditors (an
116. See generally Landers, Open End Credit Disclosure Requirements 
Under the
Truth in Lending Act, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. - (1979).
117. See Landers, Some Reflections on Truth in Lending, 1977 
U. ILL. L.F. 669.
118. See American Buyers Club v. Grayling, 53 Ill. App. 2d 611, 368 
N.E. 3d 1057
(1977); Conrad v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 57 A.D.2d 91, 394 N.Y.S.2d 
923 (1977); c.
Hernandez v. Kerry Buick Inc., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 
98,094 (N.D. Ill.
1977) (if TIL violation, cannot recover finance charge at all as a matter 
of state law).
119. See Landers, supra note 117, at 680-83. See also Hearings on 
S. 3008 Before
the Consumer Affairs Subcomm. on the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing 
and Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 409-12 (1976) (statement of Rhett Tanner).
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adverse court decision may require a complete reprinting of
forms), and increases the political polarization between consumer
and creditor representatives.
TIL, by virtue of its complexity and the likelihood of finding
an arguable violation, is not an efficient way to handle general
consumer grievances against a particular creditor or against the"system." But there is no easy answer to what is more efficient.
Numerous scholars have considered the legal system's proper re-
sponse to small claims that cannot be prosecuted economically
within the present judicial framework. Answers range from ignor-
ing small losses completely to setting up elaborate systems of
small claims and community courts. However, this is not the time
to address the issue of appropriate ways to resolve such dis-
putes. 120
The status quo does, however, present a political dilemma.
Many creditors view TIL simplification in terms of reduction in
disclosures, model forms, reduced liabilities, or something else
that will furnish significant protection against the recurring threat
of TIL litigation. Consumers, on the other hand, have viewed the
Act as an effective weapon for vindicating consumer grievances
and are reluctant to lose that utility. A legitimate question re-
mains: whether any consumer loss should be replaced by some-
thing else, and if so, what that something else should be.
III. LONG-TERM CONSUMER EDUCATION
TIL has been discussed up to now in terms of single transac-
tions, but consumer credit need not be thought of in such terms: it
may be viewed instead as a continuum of transactions. That is,
rather than thinking of one individual consumer shopping for one
credit purchase, we might visualize a given consumer engaging in
a lifetime of credit transactions: some repetitive, such as credit
card purchases; others quite rare, such as a home mortgage; and
still others falling somewhere in between, such as car purchases,
large appliance purchases, and signature loans. So viewed, it is
not anticipated that any single disclosure will produce either im-
mediate behavioral change or an individual sense of satisfaction
and well-being. Rather, the disclosures might be designed to exert
an educational influence on the consumer's credit behavior over
time. The use of standardized language on similar forms in dis-
parate transactions, for example, aids in consumer understanding,
reduces the costs of mastering each subsequent transaction, and
lowers search costs. Indeed,, it may be that directing regulatory
activities toward improving consumer understanding is the best
120. See generally D. RICE, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS, chs. 6, 21 (1975).
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method of implementing the goal of affecting transactional behav-
ior.
This objective, it would seem, has already partially been
achieved. That is, TIL has led to the adoption of an understanda-
ble and certain vocabulary for credit transactions so that when
consumers and creditors speak of the finance charge or the An-
nual Percentage Rate, they are talking about the same thing. This
standardization has made it easier to teach about consumer credit,
especially at the secondary school level. In addition, constant rep-
etition of the APR seems to have increased consumer awareness of
the general cost of credit.
Even if the goal is simply consumer education, there is still
much to be done. TIL has not achieved uniformity in stating late
charges, information on security interests, and the like. Indeed,
the Federal Reserve Board has conceded that consumers cannot
possibly understand the rule of 78s' 2' and the courts seem unable
to agree on the meaning of the terms default charges and prepay-
ment penalties. 22 As one moves from credit cost information to
credit term information, the long-term educational impact may be
undermined by an absence of standardization of concepts.
Apart from the problem of certainty of concepts is the ques-
tion of how best to serve this education function. Regardless of
the number of transactions, the consumer will not be educated un-
less at some point he examines the documents. This does not re-
quire study at the point of transacting, but the document can be
sufficiently forbidding that the consumer will never read 
it. 123
Thus, the effectuation of this purpose requires a level of disclosure
that can draw the typical consumer's attention. Probably it is
more important that the credit cost disclosures be highlighted and
expressed in understandable language. Hopefully, a process of as-
similation and self-education would then sensitize the consumer
to credit cost variables, and better prepare him for each subse-
quent transaction. Ultimately, despite the frequency with which
the consumer receives credit card statements and closed-end dis-
closures, the statement may be too complex for any substantial
educational impact beyond an awareness of prevailing rates.
CONCLUSION
Despite its legislative history, Truth in Lending has only a
121. See note 57 & accompanying text supra.
122. See FRB Off. Staff Int. No. FC-0044, [1974-1977 Transfer Binder] CONS.
CRED. GUIDE (CCH) $ 31,535 (1977); FRB Off. Staff Int. No. FC-0102, id. 31,680.
123. The FRB survey indicates that the vast majority of respondents, about two
thirds, disagree with the statement that most consumers read TIL statements care-
fully. See 1977 CONSUMER CREDIT SURVEY, supra note 85, at 15-19.
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doubtful utility in affecting transactional behavior by consumers,
largely because of built-in diseconomies: the disclosures are too
complex, they come too late, and the consumer may not consider
the stakes worth the shopping effort. Other unintended but argua-
bly desirable functions for credit disclosure have emerged through
experience under TIL: alerting consumers to unfair terms, estab-
lishing the creditor's good faith, synopsizing the credit contract,
providing a vehicle for law reform, and offering consumers a
means of achieving rough justice. For all of these, TIL is an im-
perfect tool. The one function of credit disclosures that seems
most consistent with the original legislative intent, and the most
capable of achievement, is the effectuation of an ongoing, long-
term rise in consumer education and sophistication about credit
matters.
At this writing, congressional consideration of Truth in Lend-
ing simplification is far from complete. The hopes and motiva-
tions of interested parties are as diverse as the possible functions
for disclosure, and the proposals for simplification reflect that di-
versity. The pending bills also reflect the inevitable scars of politi-
cal compromise.
It is impossible to predict, and fruitless to speculate on, the
outcome of these efforts, nor is it worthwhile to dwell on specific
aspects of those proposals. Suffice it to say that they contain
images and shadows of virtually all the notions presented here.
To be in the public interest, any ultimate "simplification" of TIL
will require the lawmakers to face, honestly and forthrightly, the
functions the disclosure scheme ought to and can perform. It is
hoped that this analysis aids in that process.
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